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CONTROLLING STRATEGIC VOTING:
PROPERTY RULE OR
LIABILITY RULE?
ZoHAR GosHEN*
ABSTRACT
Strategic voting-situations where voters place their votes ac
cording to their assessment of how other voters will behave rather
than according to their actual preference-results in distorted deci
sionmaking. Strategic voting can cause the company to lose desired
transactions and can also be used to coerce voters into accepting al
ternatives they would have otherwise rejected. An analysis of the var
ious types of strategic voting situations which arise in corporate law
demonstrates the author's argument that strategic voting is inherent in
the voting mechanism, regardless of the type of group involved or of
the decision being made. Maintaining a free and unrestricted voting
environment is imperative in order to maximize the voting system's
potential as a tool for expressing the true "group preference," which
is a measure of transaction efficiency and serves to better the group's
position. To achieve this goa� the author proposes a combined solu
tion: first, the adoption of a simple majority rule in all group votes,
which will significantly limit the effect of holdouts; second, the elimi
nation of coerced voting by prohibiting individuals from acting con
trary to the majority decision in cases where such actions might
adversely affect the group. Requiring the entire group to adopt a uni
fied course of action will eliminate the free rider problem, the pris
oner's dilemma problem, and the coordination problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the use of coercive strategic voting tactics by interested
parties and the approval of these tactics by the courts, the once democratic nature of voting in corporate law is becoming increasingly dictatorial in nature. The intentional distortion of the voting mechanism
facilitates the coercion of groups of voters into approving any dictated
resolution and systematically undermines the voting mechanism's capacity to aggregate individual preferences. This result is problematic
because in such cases there is no basis for concluding that the approved transaction is efficient or fair. The constructive consent provided by sincere voting disappears. Strategic voting hinders the ability
of investors' groups to make prudent decisions collectively.
Although an investor's decision to join an investors' group is
made on an individual basis (buying the security), from that moment
onward the individual investor becomes a member of a group that is
party to a securities contract with the company whereby most decisions must be made collectively.1 It is therefore necessary to adopt a
mechanism that ,vill enable the group to make collective decisions
with regard to implementing and amending the securities contract.2
1. Every investor group is party to a contract with the company in which it has invested.
Shareholders, for example, are party to a contract embodied in the company's charter or bylaws, while bondholders are party to a loan contract embodied in the particular issue's trust
indenture.
2. During the lifetime of a firm, many decisions are made that affect the legal rights of its
securities holders. Often such decisions take the form of a vote to amend the company's bylaws, charter, or trust indentures in order to alter the rights associated with a specific security.
Toe rights of securities holders may also be indirectly affected by certain business decisions, such
as a merger where the company is liquidated and its shareholders are forced to exchange their
stock for cash or equity in the company into which they merge. Toe merging company's decision
clearly alters its shareholders' rights, as the cash or stock they will receive constitutes a new
nexus of rights, different from those possessed by the original security. Sometimes the consideration received in such an exchange is of lesser value than the securities held prior to the decision
to enter into the merger.
In most cases the decision to alter the rights of securities holders in a particular security
requires their consent to such a change. This principle is derived from the fact that a securitystock, preferred stock, or bond, for example-is viewed as a contract between the issuer and the
security holder. On the nature of the firm as a "Contractual Nexus," see generally Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984). Given the wide range of decisions
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The voting system is a widely accepted collective decisionmaking
mechanism. Its acceptance is based on the notion that the majority's
opinion is the best manifestation of the group position regarding the
alternative that would maximize the expected return for the group as
a whole (the "group preference").3 Group preference in the voting
system is comparable to consent in a transaction between individuals.4
Because the group is comprised of individuals, each of whom has a
different subjective assessment of whether the transaction is worthwhile, we must find a mechanism that will allow us to extract group
consent from the individuals' subjective assessments. The voting system is used to form the group's position, as expressed in the majority
position.5 In other words, majority consent is the same as group consent, which is the best tool for approximating transaction-efficiency. 6
requiring the agreement of various groups of securities holders, it is easy to see the importance
of voting systems in corporate law.
3. One notion of the voting system's function is based on the idea that when a large
number of voters attempt to assess the most desirable alternative, there is a greater probability
that the larger group's assessment is "correct" See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA. L REv. 549 (1984).
4. Consent is the indicator of efficient transactions, in which assets are transferred from
those who value them less to those who value them more. See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 13, 89, 99 (4th ed., 1992). When Debbie sells an asset to David, we assume
that the asset is worth less to Debbie than it is to David and, therefore, that the transaction is
efficient. This, however, is only an assumption. Because the transaction expresses the differences between Debbie and David's subjective assessment of the asset's value, we can never know
for sure whether the transaction is indeed efficient. As bystanders we are forced to base our
calculations on an objective assessment of the asset's value, and such an assessment will never
correspond exactly to the interested parties' subjective assessments. See Timothy J. Muris, Cost
of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL
Srun. 379 (1983).
The assumption that a transaction is efficient is based on a reasonable indicator: consent. If
Debbie agreed to sell the asset and David agreed to buy it, we may assume that each of them did
so because, based on their own subjective valuation of the asset, they believed that the transaction was worthwhile. Once we shift our focus from transactions between individuals (individual
owners of assets) to transactions between groups Goint owners of an asset), identifying efficient
transactions becomes a much more complicated task.
5. A number of justifications for adopting the voting system in corporate decisionmaking
have been suggested in the literature. According to one theory, majority preference expresses
the decision that is best for the group as a whole. This ensures that the agreement of securities
holders to any change of the group's rights is efficient; that is, the group's situation will be improved, or at least not adversely affected, by the decision. See Shmuel Nitzan & Uriel Procaccia,
Optimal Voting Procedures for Profit Maximizing Firms, 51 PUB. CHOICE 191, 200 (1986). Other
theories suggest that majority preference brings us closest to the decision that would be reached
if all the group's securities were held by one individual. These theorists assume that the individual's decision will always be the most efficient. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Sole Owner
Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 198 (1988).
6. The term "transaction-efficiency" is used to describe a transaction that is Pareto-efficient: Assets are shifted from the party who values them less to the party who values them more,
and the transaction has no effect on anyone else. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 13.
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The voting system incorporates the individuals' subjective assessments
into one position, which expresses the group's consent.
Preference accorded to the majority's opinion is not based on ideological factors but on simple probability. The majority view is preferable because it is more likely to be correct. Why assume ex ante that
the minority's opposition to a certain transaction is preferable when a
majority of individuals in the group believe the transaction to be
worthwhile?7 Having said this, however, it is certainly possible that
we may discover ex post that the minority's opinion was indeed correct, just as when an individual sells an asset to another individual for
a mutually agreed upon price and later regrets the sale. This does not
detract from the power of the voting system to serve as an indicator of
transaction-efficiency.8 In both instances we are interested in general
mechanisms for identifying efficient transactions ex ante.9
The capacity of the voting system to serve as a tool for ascertaining a group's position from the individual positions of its members
depends on a number of parameters.10 There is, however, one precondition that is crucial to the proper functioning of the voting system.
7. In fact, the minority also prefers a regime in which decisions are made by majority vote.
The individual's decision to join such a group is based on her understanding that majority rule
will protect her from her own mistakes. Although in any given vote minority members may
believe that their opinion is "correct," they acknowledge that statistically it is not. See Michael
Taylor, Proof of a Theorem on Majority Rule, 14 BEHAv. SCI. 228 (1969) (a voter behind a
perfect veil of ignorance regarding the proposals to be voted on and her expected position on
them would prefer a simple majority rule).
8. "Majority opinion" is still an indicator of transaction-efficiency even in the event that a
single individual holds the majority of the group's assets. In such a case, the individual's opinion
will be the "majority opinion." We may assume that the majority's assessment has a greater
probability of being correct because of the differences between individual voters with respect to
the resources they will invest in becoming informed. Adopting a poor decision will have a grave
effect on the individual who holds the majority of the group's assets, just as adopting a good
decision will improve her situation. As a result, she will have a greater incentive to become
informed and will invest more resources towards this end. When one individual in the group
invests more resources in becoming informed than the other members of the group, it is reasonable to assume that her assessments will be of a higher quality. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383,387 (1970); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3.
9. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute
to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 553, 557-58 (1993).
10. Given a common goal shared by voters who must choose between two options, the
optimal decisionmaking rule is a function of four parameters: the voters' abilities, the number of
voters, the system of rewards that follows from a correct or incorrect decision in a state of nature, and the probability of any state of nature occurring. 1\vo of the above parameters are
integral to our discussion: the voters' abilities and the number of voters involved in the decisionmaking process. Given a group of investors with similar abilities, a majority rule will result in
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Every individual in the group must vote sincerely, in accordance with
her genuine personal assessment of the transaction's desirability to the
group. This condition will be called "sincere voting." 11 When individuals in the group vote according to their assessment of how other voters will vote ("strategic voting") or according to their assessment of
the desirability of the transaction to themselves apart from the group
("voting in conflict of interests"), the voting system will not provide
an accurate indicator of transaction-efficiency. This Article will address only the problem of strategic voting. 12
Over the past few years, a number of innovative voting techniques have emerged with the aim of curtailing the voting system's
potential to assure transaction-efficiency. 'Typically, these techniques
aim to create a situation in which the securities holder is left with no
real choice other than to cast her vote strategically. Instead of voting
sincerely, the voter is forced to take into account how other voters will
place their votes before placing her own. Consequently, by creating
strategic voting situations it is possible to shape the voting process in a
way that would force the group to arrive at any dictated result ("coercive voting"). Occasionally, such coercive voting tactics are implemented as a response to deficiencies inherent in the voting system.13
Often, however, the use of coercive voting is nothing but a simple
display of opportunistic behavior on the part of one party to a contract (for example, the company) who wishes to distort another party's
choice (for example, that of the bondholders).14 Strategic voting impairs the voter's ability to vote sincerely and contradicts the very idea
efficient decisions and, as the size of the investor group increases, so too will the quality of its
decisions. On the other hand, if the individual investors within the group are of varying ability
levels, majority rule will prove inefficient and the efficiency of the group's decisions will decrease
as its size increases. See Schmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush, Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain
Dichotomous Choice Situations, 23 INT'L EcoN. RE.v. 289 (1982).
11. Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE 60 (Jon
Elster ed., 1986).
12. For a discussion of the problem of voting in conflict of interests situations, See Zohar
Goshen, Liability Rule or Property Rule? Voting in Conflict of Interests in Corporate Law and
Minority's Protection (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
13. See, e.g., Lewis S. Peterson, Who's Being Greedy? A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender and Exchange Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505 (1993);
Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 91 YALE LJ. 232 (1987).
14. See generally Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad
Tunes and Good, 105 HARv. L RE.v. 1821 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 1207 (1991); Note, Distress-Contingent Convertible Bonds: A Proposed
Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104 HARv. L. RE.v. 1857 (1991).
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behind the adoption of the voting system as a mechanism for group
decisionmaking.
To date, academic treatment of strategic voting and coercive voting systems has focused mainly on specific groups of securities holders, such as bondholders,15 or on specific decisions, such as
shareholder response to tender offers.16 Likewise, the courts have examined these issues separately, on a case-by-case basis, often adopting
inconsistent and sometimes even contradictory positions. 17 Additionally, scholarly writing has focused on specific external sources that
lead to the use of coercive voting and has ignored the nature of the
voting system itself, thereby neglecting to analyze both aspects of the
strategic voting problem: "natural" and coercive. While coercive strategic voting is caused by the intervention of an external force that
wishes to influence the vote's outcome, natural strategic voting is a
strategic voting situation that arises from the natural parameters of
the voting system. Consequently, suggested solutions to coercive voting regularly leave the other aspect of the problem unsolved.
This Article establishes that the problem of strategic voting is inherent in the voting system and, therefore, any conclusions reached in
this regard are relevant to all voting situations, regardless of the type
of security involved, the decision being made, or the distinctive elements of the situation. This Article argues that the law should adopt a
coherent position on the issue of strategic voting. This position should
be based on conclusions reached following a comparison between. the
unimpeded voting system and the coercive voting system, weighing
each system's successes and failures in guaranteeing efficient transactions.18 Based on such an analysis, this Article suggests a solution that
contends with both aspects of the strategic voting problem.

In order to guarantee sincere voting, I suggest establishing a general principle in corporate law: any decision that may affect the rights
associated with a particular security must be approved by a majority
vote, even regarding actions where the voter would usually be free to
act individually and independently. Once such a decision has been
made, it should bind the entire group. By forcing the entire group to
15. See supra notes 13, 14.
16. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment of
Corporate Takeovers, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 1693 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 42
(1980).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.
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act in a uniform manner (a "binding vote''), we reduce its incentive to
engage in strategic voting. Adopting this general solution will liberate
voters from the pressures of strategic voting in general and of coercive
voting in particular.19
The proposed binding vote solution appears to infringe on the
property rights of securities holders, however, because the minority
can be forced to sell its securities if such a transaction is approved by a
majority vote. Nevertheless, this Article demonstrates that according
to current law this is not the case. There is a difference between the
relationship of securities holders with other members of their group
("internal relationship"), and their relationship with third parties
("external relationship"). Indeed, the general legal protection governing the securities holders' external relationship with third parties is
based on a "property rule"; that is, any transaction to change or transfer rights should be consensual and on terms reflecting the securities
holders' individual subjective valuation of their own securities.20
However, the general legal protection governing the securities holders' internal relationship with her group is based on a "liability rule";
that is, the majority can force a transaction to change or transfer rights
of a security holder (together with the whole group) on terms reflecting some objective valuation of the securities as determined by the
majority. Hence, as the proposed solution of a binding vote belongs
to the latter category, it fits perfectly in the general fabric of corporate
law.
In Part II of this Article, I examine the voting system as a tool for
corporate decisionmaking, showing that an absence of sincere voting
results in distorted decisionmaking. With the help of game theory, I
19. Professor Bebchuk has suggested adopting a voting system that integrates a "vote" on
whether to approve a tender offer simultaneously with the tendering of the shares. See Bebchuk,
supra note 16. This solution is not applicable to the entire range of issues on which securities
holders may potentially vote. I suggest adopting a separate vote. Moreover, my proposal has an
important component that varies significantly from Professor Bebchuk's proposal. In my model
the majority's decision will bind the entire group. This element of coercion does not exist in
Bebchuk's proposal; even when the majority of voters supports the tender offer in question, no
individual shareholder is required to tender her shares.
20. The distinction between property rules and liability rules is explained in the celebrated
article by Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena·
bility: One View <!f the Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089 (1972). As to the superiority of one
rule over the other, see Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE LJ. 1027 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Do
Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE LJ. 221 (1995);
Mitchell Polinsky, On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules, 18 EcoN. INQUIRY
233 (1980).
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explain various types of strategic voting, both natural and coercive,
and demonstrate how they distort the voting system.
In Part III I present a variety of situations in corporate decisionmaking in which the voter is influenced by coercive voting, in order to
demonstrate that all of these situations are simply variations of the
same problem. These situations include tender offers, mergers, share
accumulation, reorganization of voting rights, and vote buying.
Part IV summarizes the courts' approaches to coercive voting,
which, with the exception of shareholder vote buying, have accepted,
by and large, the use of coercive techniques. In particular, I criticize
courts' adherence to strict contractual interpretation and their refusal
to apply the good faith doctrine to prohibit the use of exploitative
coercive tactics.
In Part VI present my normative conclusions and propose adopting a mandatory standard dictating that whenever an individual's action has implications for the group, that action should be approved by
a simple majority vote and decisions should be binding on the entire
group. This solution should guarantee sincere voting by liberating the
voting system from the clutches of the nemesis of strategic voting. In
addition, I appraise the practical elements of the solution and provide
rationales for making it mandatory. Finally, I address the main objection to my proposed solution: the claim that it infringes on property
rights.

II. THE VOTING l\ffiCHANISM: EFFICIENCY AND
EXPOSURE TO STRATEGIC VOTING

Intuitively, we feel comfortable using the voting system to make
decisions. Voting strikes us as both democratic and impartial. Economic models suggest that under certain circumstances voting is indeed capable of allowing groups of investors to form "group
preference," that is, to select the position that would maximize the
group's expected return from the decision.21 The voting system, however, is not perfect.22 For example, when voters do not share a common goal and the vote involves a selection among a variety of
21. See, e.g., Nitzan & Procaccia, supra note 5; Nitzan & Paroush, supra note 10.
22. In practice, most securities holders are "rationally apathetic"; that is, they lack incentive to participate in corporate voting. The phenomenon of "rational apathy" has been discussed
at length in the legal literature. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARI.Es Cl.ARK, CORPORATE LAW 390
(1986); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1427
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preferences, the voting system is unable to express "group preference."23 In such cases we find the system unsatisfactory.24
In this Article I will focus on an additional phenomenon influencing the quality of the voting system, namely, strategic voting. When a
voter votes strategically and refrains from expressing his true opinion,
the majority's position will not reflect the group's position properly,
even if all of the individuals in the group participate in the vote. In a
strategic voting environment, it cannot be said in advance that "group
preference" will be attained as a result of the vote. When the individual is not free to vote sincerely, the majority position does not necessarily have a greater probability of being correct, nor will the majority
position necessarily bring us any closer to the decision that would
have been reached by an individual holding all the relevant securities.
Therefore, we may not assume that such a vote guarantees transaction-efficiency. Having defined our goal as assuring transaction-efficiency and assuming that "group preference" expressed through the
voting system will provide us with the best approximation of transaction-efficiency, we must strive to ensure sincere voting.

By its very nature the voting system is susceptible to strategic voting. Its level of susceptibility is variable, depending on a number of
factors to be outlined shortly. I begin by demonstrating the problem
(1964). However, despite this weakness it is clear that the voting system does possess the potential to express group preference. Group members have the option, should they so choose, to
invest in the necessary information and to vote regardless of the costs. So, for example, when an
important decision may have a serious financial impact on the securities holders, a larger percentage of the group will invest in becoming informed. In short, the "rational apathy" problem,
although a weakness in the voting system, can affect the desirability of a vote but not the quality
of the system.
Nevertheless, one could argue that an undesirable vote is necessarily of inferior quality because the fewer the participants, the lower the quality of the decision. The quality of the mechanism, however, as a function of the desirability of the vote should not necessarily be examined
uniquely from the point of view of the present shareholders and those with formal voting rights,
but from the point of view of the market, in which we find the potential purchasers of the security, who price the security on a daily basis. Unlike the individual investor, it is always desirable
for the market to "vote" by executing transactions or facilitating a takeover.
23. This problem is a weakness in all decisionmaking rules and is in no way unique to the
voting system. This result is derived from Arrow's theorem, which suggests that any decisionmaking rule that is meant to extract the "group preference" from a variety of individual preferences within the group is doomed to fail, given the basic assumptions that the rule must fulfill.
See KENNETII J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 7 (2d ed. 1963); Charles
Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation, 20 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 511
(1976).
24. Even if the "rationally apathetic" securities holders were to participate in the vote and
express their true choices, we still could not arrive at a result that reflects the "group
preference."
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of "natural" strategic voting-the strategic voting situation in which
voters find themselves without any outside intervention in the voting
process due to the natural parameters of the voting system. I then
demonstrate the other type of strategic voting, namely, the coerced
strategic vote. Coerced strategic voting is a strategic vote caused by
the intervention of an outside force wishing to influence the vote's
outcome.

A.

"NATURAL" STRATEGIC VOTING

In principle we may differentiate between two separate problems
arising in the context of "natural" strategic voting: the free rider problem and the holdout problem. In both situations the securities holder
votes for an option contrary to the one she actually supports. In the
case of the free rider, the securities holder's abstention or opposition
is motivated by her desire to benefit as a result of another individual's
support for a certain decision or action. The free rider benefits by not
joining the group. In the case of a holdout, however, the securities
holder who ,vithholds her vote does so in order to reap an additional
profit as a result of her support at a later, more critical stage. Unlike
the free rider, the individual holding out knows that ultimately it will
be to her advantage to give her consent and to join in the collective
action. As I demonstrate in this section, both the free rider problem
and the holdout problem can lead to distorted decisionmaking. As a
result, transactions that would have been beneficial for all parties involved are doomed to fail. 25
1.

The Free Rider Problem

The free rider problem is illustrated in the following example.26
Let us assume that a potential corporate raider is interested in
purchasing control of a target company. She believes that under her
control the target company will increase in value. Let us also assume
that, in order to gain control, she must acquire at least fifty percent of
the target company's shares. She makes a tender offer to the shareholders to tender their shares at a premium of two dollars above the
current market value, and she conditions this offer on the tendering of
at least fifty percent of the shares. Assuming that the company's market value on the day of the offer reflects its value accurately, shareholders should respond positively and tender their shares.
25. See Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J.
26. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 16.
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Shareholders are also aware, however, that the premium offered for
their shares reflects only a fraction of the expected increase in the
company's value as a result of its new management. Hence, even if
the two-dollar premium appears to be a worthwhile offer for the individual shareholder, she will refrain from tendering her shares out of
strategic considerations. The individual shareholder will behave in
this fashion in the hope that other shareholders will be satisfied with a
two-dollar premium and will agree to tender their shares, thereby
bringing about the desired change in management. If this happens the
individual shareholder who did not tender her shares will benefit from
an increase of, let us say, four dollars in the shares' value due to the
new management. In other words, the individual shareholder desires
to take a "free ride" at the expense of both the new controlling shareholder, who will incur additional expenses to bring about new and better management, and the tendering shareholders, who will incur the
cost of transferring control because they tendered their shares for a
smaller premium. It seems obvious that in this situation most individual shareholders will prefer to be free riders and refrain from tendering their respective shares. The result is that almost invariably, to the
dismay of both the raider and the shareholders, including the free
rider herself, the takeover attempt will fail.27
The free rider phenomenon is displayed in a numerical matrix.28
This matrix demonstrates the expected benefit for an individual voter
who does not expect her vote to influence the outcome of the entire
vote given the other voters' behavior:
INDIVIDUAL VOTER
DON'T
DON'T

ALL

TENDER

TENDER

TENDER

0, 0

0, 0

2, 4

2,2

OTHER VOTERS

TENDER

The individual voter, who assumes that her vote will have no influence on the final outcome of the vote, will adopt the following
logic: If the individual does not tender and other shareholders do not
27. See id. at 43.
28. The use of matrixes is characteristic of game theory: The left hand number in each
quadrant refers to the player listed to the left of the matrix's expected benefit, while the right
hand number in each quadrant refers to the player listed above the matrix's expected benefit. In
the example above, the right hand number in each quadrant represents the individual investor's
expected benefit, and the number in the left of each quadrant represents the other investors'
expected benefit, depending on the option they choose.
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tender their shares either, the required shares will not be tendered,
the takeover will fail, and none of the shareholders will improve their
situation (0,0). If the individual tenders and the other shareholders do
not, the necessary majority will not obtain and the takeover will again
fail (0,0). If both the individual and the other shareholders acquiesce,
the takeover will succeed. In this scenario, all shareholders will sell
their shares for the two-dollar premium (2,2). However, if the individual refuses to tender her shares while the other shareholders do
tender theirs, the takeover will be successful, the tendering shareholders will receive the two-dollar premium, and the individual shareholder who refrained from tendering her shares will watch as the
value of her shares rises by four dollars under the new management
(2,4). It is clear from this example that it will always be in the individual voter's best interest not to tender her shares, regardless of how
other shareholders behave. It is also clear that if a large number of
shareholders adopt this logic, the majority of shares needed to facilitate the takeover will not be tendered and the takeover will fail.
2.

The Holdout Problem

The holdout problem has recently received increased attention,
due to the growing number of bankruptcies and reorganizations of
failing companies as a result of the excess debt piled on in the 1980s.29
In restructuring a failing company, amendments are often made to the
trust indentures of the company's various bond issues. The purpose of
these amendments is to ease the company's debt load. Occasionally,
these amendments go so far as to alter the issue's interest rate.
Changes in the interest rate of a bond issue may only be made with
the consent of all bondholders.30
Let us assume that in order to prevent a company from going
bankrupt-a bankruptcy that would most likely cause grave damage
to all of the company's creditors-it is necessary to obtain the consent
of all owners of bonds bearing twelve percent yearly interest to recalibrate the interest rate on their bonds to ten percent. If their consent is received, the company will be able to raise additional capital
and again be profitable, obviously to the benefit of all those in possession of its securities.
In this situation every bondholder knows that her consent is imperative. Without unanimous consent the company is doomed to
29. See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1207-08.
30. See Roe, supra note 13, at 232.
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bankruptcy. Recognizing this power the individual bondholder will
behave strategically and withhold her consent. She will pursue this
course of action even though it is clear to her that if the company goes
bankrupt she will receive significantly less than what her bonds would
have been worth had she agreed to recalibrate their interest rate to
ten percent. Because the group of bondholders as a whole will benefit
from resetting the interest rates of their bonds, the individual will try,
in exchange for her consent, to extort a greater part of the profit the
company stands to make as a result of the reorganization.31 The obvious problem here is that all bondholders will adopt this strategy, the
reorganization attempt will fail without their consent, and the company will be forced into bankruptcy to the detriment of all holders of
its securities, including the bondholders who withheld consent.32

In the typical holdout situation, individuals holding out see
before them a number of possible matrixes showing their expected
benefit, each with a different level of probability depending on the
various options facing the other voters:
MATRIX A

INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CONSENT

OPPOSE

-4,-4

-4,-4

CONSENT

-4,-4

2,2

ALL OTHER VOTERS

MATRIXB

INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CONSENT

OPPOSE

-4,-4

-4,-4

CONSENT

3,3

2,2

ALL OTHER VOTERS

31. If the cost of meeting the extortioners' demands exceeds the value of forgoing twopercent interest on the bonds, it is clearly impossible to meet the extortioners' demands and also
undertake a successful reorganization.
32. At this point it is important to emphasize that the extortioners' true opinion regarding
the desirability of the proposed reorganization is one of support.
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INDIVIDUAL VoTER
OPPOSE

CONSENT

OPPOSE

-4,-4

-4,-4

CoNSENT

1, 3

2,2

ALL OTHER VOTERS

In the holdout problem, as opposed to the free rider problem, the
individual voter is aware that she has the power to influence the outcome of the vote, but she cannot be certain of the benefit to be accrued by her opposition. Given a potential transaction, the following
information is clear to the individual holding out: If the individual
voter opposes and the other voters are also opposed, the transaction
will fail and all securities' holders will be adversely affected (-4,-4). If
the individual voter consents and the other voters also consent, the
transaction will take place and all voters will benefit from the restructuring (2,2). If the individual opposes, even if all other voters consent,
the individual's opposition will be sufficient to cause the transaction to
fail. The individual, however, does not possess perfect information
about the results of her opposition. Three possible options emerge:

(1) The individual holding out does so on the assumption that she
can extract a better offer. If this assumption is incorrect and, for
whatever reason, the bidder does not make a better offer, both she
and the other voters will be worse off (Matrix A: -4,-4).
(2) If the individual's assumption is correct her opposition could
lead to an offer significantly better than the original one (2,2), to her
own and the other voters' benefit (Matrix B: 3,3).
(3) Even in the event that her assumption was incorrect and the
bidder does not return with a better offer, the individual holding out
may be able to increase her own expected profit by ensuring an unequal distribution of the expected profit for the entire transaction. This
outcome may be achieved by extorting payment from the other voters
(Matrix C: 1,3), without requiring the bidder to make additional payments. The other voters, however, will have to convince the individual holding out to allow the transaction to take place by accepting an
unequal distribution of the profit. Another alternative is to extort a
separate payment from the bidder. In this situation the bidder will
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have to pay the individual holding out in order to gain her consent by
reducing payments to the other voters (Matrix C: 1,3).33
From the viewpoint of the individual voter who believes that the
available offer is the best that can be expected, it will make sense to
consent to the transaction and hope that the other voters will act accordingly. However, if even one of the other voters opposes the transaction in an attempt to extort a larger percentage of the expected
profit in exchange for her consent-whether because of her mistaken
estimation of the bidder's ability to make up her bid or because of her
desire to extort a larger percentage of the profit from the other voters-the transaction will fail. 34
3. Free Riders and Holdouts: Fraternal Twins
The distinction between holding out and free riding is a fine one.
The dominant characteristic of the holdout is the individual's knowledge that ultimately it will be advantageous for her to consent to the
transaction. She will oppose the transaction for the sole purpose of
extracting a better price in exchange for her consent, which she intends to give in any event. However, if the individual fails to estimate
the potential profit of the transaction accurately, she may "push too
far" and cause the transaction to fail, even though the transaction
would have been beneficial for her too. The greater the number of
individuals whose consent is required for a given transaction to succeed, the greater the importance of each individual vote and, consequently, the greater the probability of a holdout. Therefore, if a
ninety-percent majority of the securities holders is required to approve a transaction, as opposed to a simple fifty-percent majority,
there is greater chance for voters to assume they have the power to
"block" the transaction and, consequently, to oppose the transaction
based on strategic considerations.
The free rider, on the other hand, prefers to follow her actions
through to the end. The free rider's opposition is not an attempt to
raise the price of her consent, as she is not seeking to profit from the
33. In reality, every voter will see only one possible option, which in essence will be a
combination of all of the matrixes diagrammed above. Toe weight of each matrix in the combination will be determined by what the individual perceives as the probability of any of the three
possible outcomes taldng place.
34. Toe transaction could fail even if the individual's estimation of the bidder's ability to
increase her bid is not mistaken. This would be the case if the bidder refused to "succumb" for
strategic considerations, namely, to "signal" the market by creating a reputation of a "tough"
negotiator in order to deter future holdout attempts.
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sale of her consent at a later stage. Rather, she hopes to benefit from
the transaction taking place without her consent. If the transaction
takes place without the free rider's vote she will benefit from the
transaction, while saving the cost of supporting and facilitating it.
Free riding is only possible in situations where the transaction can succeed despite the individual's opposition.35
If, for example, we changed the majority required to adjust the

interest rate on a bond from one hundred percent, as in the previous
example, to fifty percent the likelihood of a holdout would decrease as
a result of the individual's limited ability to "block" the transaction.
Similarly, free riding would no longer be possible because the majority's decision to adjust the interest rate on the bonds would bind all
bondholders, including those opposed to such a change. On the other
hand, if bondholders were asked to exchange their twelve-percent
bonds for new ten-percent bonds and fifty percent of the bonds had to
be exchanged in order to facilitate this transaction, the holdout problem would diminish. The free rider problem, however, would still persist because even if a majority of individual voters consented to
exchange the bonds, this would not bind the dissenting bondholders.
Therefore, if as a result of the reorganization the value of the original
bonds is greater than the value of the new bonds-because the original bonds pay a higher rate of interest and the company's stability has
increased -the rational bondholder will prefer to sit back and watch
the other bondholders offer their bonds while she takes a free ride.
The free-riding investor benefits from the increase in the value of the
original bonds due to the improvement of the company's financial
situation.36
A further difference exists between free riding and holding out.
While free riding can only occur in situations where several voters are
involved, a holdout is also feasible when only one voter is involved. In
the tender offer example used above, the individual shareholder's
ability to benefit from a change in control is contingent on whether
other shareholders are willing to tender their shares to ensure the
talceover's success. If all the targeted shares are held by one individual she would be unable to take a free ride on herself. She could,
35. In other words, if the free rider believed that her vote could influence the outcome, she
would be unable to act strategically because her vote would cause the transaction to fail and she
could not expect to profit by taking a free ride.
36. Over the past few years, we have witnessed investors purchasing bonds of failing companies and speculating that the company will go through a reorganization that will allow them to
profit through free riding. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1233.
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however, hold out and refuse to tender any shares in an attempt to
cause the bidder to raise the offer.37
Yet another important difference exists between holding out and
free riding. Holdout is found in voting systems requiring a
supermajority, thereby empowering the opposing minority. As long
as its consent is required, the minority can engage in strategic opposition to the vote-regardless of whether its consent is requested
through a group vote or by direct appeal to each member of the minority group. Therefore, any attempt to mitigate the effect of a
holdout will necessitate reliance on a smaller majority to approve a
transaction.38 On the other hand, the free rider problem emerges
through the individual's ability to abstain from voting and then act in
opposition to the group. It is clear that a requirement of a one-hundred-percent majority would prevent the individual from acting contrary to the group, thereby eliminating the free rider problem. In such
a situation the individual would have no strategic interest in voting
contrary to the group (as opposed to the holdout) because she would
be unable to act separately from the group.39 Nevertheless, the free
rider problem can be solved without imposing a unanimity condition
by requiring the individual to act in accordance with the majority's
decision, regardless of how she voted, because free riding is only possible if the individual can both vote and act independently from the
group.4o
B.

COERCED STRATEGIC VoTING

Market players-mainly lawyers and investment bankers-realized that the present voting system, because of natural strategic voting, has the potential to cause efficient transactions to fail. This
realization induced them to develop techniques to minimize the
37. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 358-59. It is important to stress that the holdout phenomenon described here relates to a situation in which, from the perspective of the individual holding
out, the transaction is desirable and her behavior is just an attempt to make the transaction even
more desirable for herself. It is impossible to actually detennine whether opposition to a particular transaction developed because the offering price was too low to begin with, or for the purpose of forcing a more desirable transaction.
38. See id. at 361.
39. In this situation, every voter has the power to determine the fate of the transaction.
Therefore, it is impossible for the transaction to take place in spite of her opposition.
40. If every voter is bound to adopt the same course of action, there is no strategic value to
opposing a decision because not only will the free rider be unable to take a free ride on the
promoters' profits, but she may also cause the entire transaction to fail. Therefore the optimal
strategy for the individual is to vote in accordance with her actual projection of the desirability
of the transaction.
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problems of free riding and holdouts. 41 In many cases, however, the
techniques they developed went beyond providing a solution to the
problem of strategic voting. In some cases, they created systems that
actually exacerbated strategic voting, thereby coercing voters to consent to undesirable transactions.42

In coercive strategic voting the voter is placed in one of two scenarios, both of which are well known to game theorists. One is the
prisoner's dilemma, in which every voter has one dominant strategic
preference completely unrelated to the positions of other members of
the group, causing all voters as a group to be placed in an inferior
position. The other is the coordination problem, in which every voter
has two possible strategic alternatives but invariably chooses the less
beneficial one, due to a lack of coordination between the voters.
1.

The Prisoner's Dilemma

The story from which the prisoner's dilemma takes its name tells
of two thieves who robbed a bank and were caught fleeing the scene
of the crime. In their possession at the time of arrest was an unlicensed firearm. Although the police were positive that the two had
committed the robbery in question, they had no evidence to prove
their claim. The detective in charge of the investigation separated the
two thieves and offered each the following deal: If you confess to the
robbery and your partner does too, you will each be charged with
armed robbery and the district attorney ,vill request that you each be
sentenced to five years in jail-half of the maximum penalty prescribed by law for armed robbery. If you do not confess to the robbery and your partner also does not confess, the district attorney will
only press charges against you for possession of an illegal firearm, a
crime that carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison. If you
confess to the robbery and your partner denies any involvement, the
district attorney ,vill offer you the opportunity to tum state witness
and will not press charges against you. He will, however, press
charges against your partner for armed robbery and request the maximum ten-year sentence.43 The detective's offer is displayed in the following matrix:
41. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 13 (arguing for a repeal of section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act because it encourages problems such as free riding and holdout).
42. See, e.g., supra note 14.
43. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HowARD RAlFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 95 (1957).
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PRISONER NUMBER

PRISONER NUMBER

2

DON'T CONFESS

CONFESS

DON'T CONFESS

-1,-1

-10,0

CoNFESS

0,-10

-5,-5

1

In this scenario any self-interested prisoner has one dominant
strategy-confess to participating in the robbery. This strategy is not
dependent on the other prisoner's actions.
Let us examine the situation more carefully from the point of
view of prisoner 2. If prisoner 1 denies participating in the robbery
prisoner 2 will be better off confessing. He will be made state witness
(0) rather than being charged with possession of a firearm (-1 ), as he
would if he denied participation altogether. If prisoner 1 confesses,
prisoner 2 will definitely be better off confessing because then he will
only be sentenced to five years in jail (-5), as opposed to the ten-year
(-10) sentence he would have received had he denied taking part in
the crime. Whatever way prisoner 2 views the situation, prisoner 2
will choose to confess, regardless of the strategy that prisoner 1
adopts. Similarly, prisoner 1 faces the same choices as prisoner 2, so
he too will choose to confess. Therefore, the outcome of the prisoner's dilemma will always be that both prisoners confess and are
each sentenced to five years in jail, even though had they both denied
participation, they each would have been sentenced to only one year
in prison. That is to say, each prisoner's dominant strategy causes
them to attain an inferior equilibrium that is to their mutual
detriment.

It is important to emphasize that the prisoner's dilemma is not a
problem of coordination between the prisoners, but rather a problem
of conflict of interests. Therefore, assuming that no agreement between the prisoners is enforceable, even if the prisoners were allowed
to meet before the interrogation they would not be able to solve the
dilemma. Had the prisoners agreed to deny the robbery in a meeting
prior to the investigation, the dilemma would simply play itself out at
a different level. If prisoner 2 is certain that prisoner 1 will stand by
his word and deny the robbery he will certainly prefer to confess and
not go to jail at all, even though his defection will result in prisoner 1
being sentenced to a more severe prison term (ten years). The party
who defects will benefit at the expense of the party who adheres to the
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agreement. The latter will incur a much graver punishment for denying the robbery while his perfidious friend confesses.44 Due to the
conflict of interests and the incentives influencing each prisoner-the
desire to incur a lesser punishment and the fear of a more serious
punishment as a result of his partner's betrayal-both prisoners will
choose to defect and confess in spite of their coordinated positions.45
2.

The Coordination Problem

As opposed to the prisoner's dilemma, the coordination problem
does not stem from a conflict of interests but rather, as its name implies, from a problem of coordination. In the coordination problem
all voters have identical interests and, if given the opportunity, they
could all agree on the preferable alternative. Each voter, however, is
faced with two alternatives that depend on the actions of other voters,
but they are unable to coordinate their positions with them.
In order to explain the coordination problem, I will slightly alter
the story of the prisoner's dilemma. Let us assume that both thieves
were caught, but this time they did not have a weapon in their possession. Therefore, if they both deny involvement in the robbery they
will both be set free, and if they both confess to the robbery they will
both be sentenced to five years in jail. If one of the prisoners confesses, however, and the other denies involvement the first will be sentenced to one year in jail and the second to ten years in jail. This
scenario is displayed in the following matrix:

44. See id. at 96-97.
45. If the prisoners could make a binding agreement, they could clearly solve the dilemma
through coordination and agreement Theoretically, under certain circumstances, the dilemma
could be solved without a binding agreement If the players {the prisoners) play the game many
times, a certain cooperation (mutual action) could occur; this could happen if one player "signals" to the other player his willingness to cooperate by cooperating and subsequently "punishes" the other player when he does not cooperate in one game by not cooperating in the next
In such a situation, however, it will make sense for one player to "play dumb" and continue to
act independently while waiting for the other to "signal" his desire to cooperate. Moreover, if
the number of games is known in advance, the inability to "punish" in the last game frustrates
cooperation in the second to last game, which in turn frustrates cooperation in the game before
that, and so forth until the first game. It is thus impossible to achieve cooperation when the last
game is known in advance. See MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY 112-13 (rev. ed. 1983). In
practice, the criminal underworld has its own methods for severely punishing traitors, which
significantly alters the profit expectancy a prisoner faces. Mafia hitmen prefer to take full responsibility for their actions rather than implicate the boss and get "whacked" the next day.
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PRISONER NUMBER

PRISONER NUMBER

2

DoN''I' CoNFEss

CONFESS

DoN'T CoNFESs

0, 0

-10, -1

CoNFESS

-1,-10

-5, -5

1

In this situation each prisoner's optimal strategy depends on the
other prisoner's actions. If prisoner 1 denies participating in the robbery, prisoner 2 will also be better off denying participation. In this
case both prisoners will be set free (0,0). Similarly, if prisoner 1 confesses, prisoner 2 will also be better off confessing. He will be sentenced to five years in jail (-5) rather than ten (-10), as would have
been the case had he denied involvement after his partner confessed.
Although two equilibriums exist-one where both parties confess and
the other where both parties deny-it is clear that there is one point at
which both parties will derive greater benefit. If we assume that both
prisoners will act rationally and that they both have perfect information-including knowledge that the other prisoner will act rationally
and is also in possession of perfect information-it is likely that both
prisoners will deny the charges and be set free. However, if one of the
prisoners does not have perfect information about the expected benefit or about the other prisoner-his abilities, his rationality, and the
information in his possession as to the expected benefits and the other
party's information-it is almost certain that both will confess. Barring coordination, each prisoner's suspicion that the other's confession
will damage the denying party will lead both to try and minimize the
potential punishment they face by confessing. As a result of the prisoners' inability to coordinate their positions, they will both confess,
making a decision that will be to their mutual detriment.
However, if the two prisoners are allowed to meet and to coordinate their positions, they will be able to choose the alternative most
beneficial for both. Let us assume that the prisoners are able to meet
and agree to deny participation. If prisoner 2 believes that prisoner 1
will abide by their agreement, it certainly makes sense for him to
abide by it too. Prisoner 2 has no reason to fear that prisoner 1 will
defect and cause him to be worse off, because by defecting prisoner 1
would also worsen his own plight. Moreover, such cooperation (denying the crime) is possible even without prior coordination if the players (prisoners) have played the game repeatedly, as they will
eventually coordinate positions by signaling their will to cooperate
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from game to game.46 Given the possibility of coordinating positions,
then, the coordination problem can be solved.
3. Coercive Voting and Competition Among Bidders
In corporate law interested parties often use techniques that aim

to place securities holders either in a prisoner's dilemma, a coordination problem, or a combination of both. These techniques force voters to vote strategically (rather than sincerely), in a predetermined
setting that enables the interested party to dictate the result of such a
vote. Coercive voting techniques incorporate three main elements.
The first and most important is the structuring of the vote so that
every individual in the group may act separately from the group. Usually, a situation is created in which a security holder is indirectly "voting" through an individual independent action.47 In such "voting by
action," the majority position does not bind the entire group and does
not require uniform action.48
The second element in coercive strategic voting is increased dependence of expected profits on the actions of other group members,
for example, conditioning a transaction on the support of a certain
46. Some studies have found that in games repeated many times, where the players did not
know when the game would end, coordination can exist even if the players are placed in the
prisoners' dilemma. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 42-43 {1984).
47. In most cases, the offer is to exchange one security for another. The exchange offer,
just as the sale of a security, is an activity normally viewed as a derivative of ownership of a
security, which every voter is free to do individually.
48. This element explains why coercive voting is most frequently found in tender offers
rather than in the day-to-day management of the company. Whenever a vote takes place in a
company's general meeting-whether on an issue of day-to-day management of the company or
on the implementation of structural changes-the voters act as an organ of the company, and
their decision binds and influences all voters. The outcome of the vote is the "group preference."
Every voter can vote according to her will, but must abide by the decision arrived at by the vote
which will affect her just as any other security holder in the group. As a result, strategic voting is
not possible because it is based on the voter's ability to act differently from the other voters and
on her desire to do so to either reap an additional profit or minimize a potential Joss.
When the voters are not voting at a meeting as a single body, however, the vote actually
emerges through the actions of each security holder, as she is free to choose and act as she
pleases, even if her actions are contrary to the majority's opinion. The tender offer is a typical
example of this situation. In a tender offer each shareholder may choose whether or not to
tender her shares without being bound by the opinion or preference of the remainder of the
shareholders. In this situation each voter faces "incentives" to act differently from other voters
in order to reap an additional profit or minimize a potential loss. This background is necessary
for implementing coercive strategic voting techniques, and this is also the reason that most of the
examples I cite below deal with matters related to tender offers and control.
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percentage of voters to ensure that opposing voters will find themselves in a minority after the transaction takes place.49
The third element is the ability to make securities holders who
actually oppose the transaction worse off, specifically, the ability to
not only prevent opposing securities holders from profiting as free riders but also to worsen their position vis-a-vis the one in which they
would have found themselves had they consented to the transaction.50

It is important to emphasize that the last two elements can also
be utilized when securities holders vote in a meeting. The simplest
way is to offer a payment to every voter who votes in favor of the
transaction. As a result, even if the vote's result will bind the entire
group and affect all investors in the same manner, voters who support
the decision will receive an additional payment in exchange for their
support rather than as a result of the decision. In such a situation,
despite the meeting's outward appearance, each voter will actually
vote on her own.
Securities holders facing successful implementation of coercive
voting tactics lack the ability to "negotiate" as a group. However,
there is a market force which mitigates the effect of coercion on the
group, namely, competition among bidders, which is actually competition over the right to coerce the group. Suppose that a group of shareholders has been made a tender offer which was structured so as to
coerce the group to tender their shares for ten dollars a share, while
they value it at fifteen dollars. Barring a better offer, shareholders
will tender their shares. If there are several bidders, however, competition among them will drive the price up. If the ensuing price is
greater than fifteen dollars a share, competition will result in an efficient transaction. When the price is greater than ten dollars a share
but less than fifteen, the transaction is still inefficient, but the competition mitigated the shareholders' potential loss.
49. In certain instances, a response by holders of at least 90% of the securities is required
in order to bind the bidder to her offer. One of the dangers of being left in the minority after a
transaction has taken place is the possibility that the security will become illiquid and will be
delisted from the securities exchange where it is traded.
50. This effect may be achieved in a number of ways, some of which will be described
below. In any event, there is a difference in principle between the treatment of the free rider
problem and the treatment of the holdout problem. The elements described above have a different effect on the free rider problem than they do on the holdout problem. Because these phenomena are essentially quite similar, however, many instances are, for all intents and purposes, a
combination of the free rider phenomenon and the holdout phenomenon. According to the
relative force of each of these phenomena, the element that has more power to influence the
voters is emphasized.
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Nevertheless, competition among bidders cannot be relied upon
to assure transaction-efficiency for several reasons. First, in many circumstances competition is not possible because the group must transact solely with the other party to the contract. For instance, in cases of
reorganization of voting rights or of debt restructuring, the company
alone can transact with the securities holders. Second, competition
does not always occur, even when it is viable and, indeed, competition
is not the case in every tender offer. Third, competition among bidders does not always involve a sufficient number of competitors and
thus cannot serve as a reliable indication that the resulting transaction
is in fact effi.cient,51 and even the sole owner who faces several competing offers is not always able to close a deal. Therefore, although in
some circumstances competition among bidders mitigates the effect of
coercive voting, it does not solve the problem itself.
III. COERCED STRATEGIC VOTING IN CORPORATE LAW

In order to demonstrate my contention that all coercive voting
situations are, in a sense, identical and simply variations of a more
general theme, I will examine several instances of coercive voting, beginning ,vith the shareholders.

A.

SHAREHOLDERS

Various techniques have been employed in corporate takeovers,
including outright purchase of control, tender offers, mergers, and
stock accumulation. Each of these techniques poses its own unique
difficulties. For the purpose of our discussion, it is important to examine the last three.

1. Tender Offers
A tender offer is one made directly to the shareholders, asking
them to "tender" their shares to a prospective purchaser in exchange
for the consideration she offers. The tender offer circumvents the
management, thus threatening its position. As a result, management
is forced to manage the company more efficiently.52 But the very fact
51. This is due to the familiar problem of "thin" markets, markets in which the number of
potential bidders is small. See, e.g., Eruc RAsMUsEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INmoDUCTION TO GAME THEORY 227 (1989) (asserting that the usual assumptions of efficient, competitive markets fail in cases of thin markets).
52. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL EcoN.
110, 113 (1965).
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that the offer is directed at the shareholders themselves is also its
weakness. The tender offer replaces collective negotiation with the
management team by individual shareholder action. In so doing, the
tender offer opens the door for both "natural" and coercive strategic
voting.
The initiator of a tender offer risks failure as a result of potential
strategic voting by the shareholders, which may take the form of free
riding and holdouts. Free riding results from the shareholders' wish to
share with the bidder in the benefits that will accrue to the company
under her management, while the holdout results from the shareholders' wish to cause the bidder to raise her offer so as to extort an additional part of the potential profit. Therefore, even if the bidder makes
a tender well above market price, there is no guarantee that her offer
will be successful. In practical terms, the shares are usually held by a
large number of shareholders so that holding out does not pose a serious threat because it is sufficient that a majority of shareholders accept the offer for the bidder to gain control.53
On the other hand, Grossman and Hart have shown that the free
rider problem has the potential to strike a critical blow to the tender
offer.54 Free riding, however, is stymied by the bidder's ability to prevent shareholders who do not tender their shares from sharing in the
benefits derived from her gain of control. Free riding is not possible if
the bidder can ensure that the profit expected by the shareholders
who choose not to tender will be less than the profit earned by those
tendering, thus paving the way for coercive strategic voting.
Professor Bebchuk has pointed out that a shareholder's fear of
becoming a minority shareholder will cause her to tender her shares,
even for a suboptimal premium.55 Sometimes this fear is based on the
assumption that the value of the minority's shares will decrease after a
takeover, particularly if there is a chance that the shares will be
delisted.
Let us assume that, prior to a tender offer, a particular stock is
trading at eight dollars a share, yet the shareholders value the stock at
ten dollars a share (for example, because of the chances of a future
tender offer at a higher price). A tender offer which conditions that at
least fifty percent of the outstanding shares be tendered is made at
53.
Supply
54.
55.

See, e.g., Lloyd R. Cohen, Why Tender Offers? The Efficient Market Hypothesis, the
of Stock, and Signaling, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1990).
See Grossman & Hart, supra note 16.
See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 1717-19.
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nine dollars a share, while the estimated value of the minority shares
after the takeover is seven dollars. As the shareholder does not know
how other shareholders value the stock, she is faced with two possible
matrixes:
MATRIX A

INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CoNSENT

OPPOSE

8, 10

8, 10

CoNSENT

9, 7

9, 9

ALL OTHER VOTERS

MATRIXB

INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CONSENT

OPPOSE

10, 10

10, 10

CONSENT

9, 7

9, 9

ALL OTHER VOTERS

The shareholder does not know the other shareholders' estimate
of the stock's true value. They may value the stock at eight dollars a
share, the market value, but they may also estimate, as does our shareholder, that the stock is worth ten dollars a share. If the other shareholders believe that the stock is worth eight dollars a share, they will
certainly tender the shares. In this case, it will also be preferable for
the individual shareholder to tender her shares, so as to receive nine
dollars in return, as opposed to holding on to her shares and becoming
a minority shareholder after the takeover, which would leave her with
a stock worth only seven dollars a share (Matrix A). However, if the
other shareholders agree with the individual shareholder that the
stock is worth ten dollars a share, it will be worthwhile to them to
oppose the takeover (Matrix B). Given the probability of either of
these scenarios occurring, the individual shareholder may find herself
in a situation similar in some ways to the prisoner's dilemma and in
other ways to the coordination problem.
Each individual in the group is faced ,vith the possibility that the
other group members estimate the share's value to be eight dollars
and will therefore tender their shares. Such a shareholder will develop a matrix reflecting her subjective probability of the other group
members estimating the shares' value at eight dollars. As the difference between the offered price and the value of the minority shares
increases, even a slight probability of the other shareholders tendering

768

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:741

their shares will suffice to cause the individual shareholder to adopt
one dominant strategy: offer her shares independently of the other
shareholders. If all other shareholders oppose the tender offer and do
not tender their shares, the individual's acceptance will have no effect.
Despite the individual's acceptance, the tender offer will fail and the
shares will remain at the same price they were valued at prior to the
takeover.
However, if the other shareholders accept the offer and tender
their shares, it will still be preferable for the individual shareholder to
offer her shares in order to profit by one dollar from tendering her
shares and at the same time avoid losing one dollar by being in the
minority. It will be worthwhile for the individual shareholder to
tender her shares even if she does not believe that the premium offered reflects the shares' true value. Because all shareholders will
adopt this strategy, the end result will be that all shareholders will
tender their shares. Therefore, any tender offer will succeed, regardless of whether or not the offer is actually preferred by the shareholders as a group.56
2. Mergers
When a merger is proposed, the decision of whether to approve it
is made at the shareholders general meeting57 and binds all shareholders, making free riding impossible. If the merger is approved, all
shareholders will receive the same consideration. Similarly, it is not
possible to place the shareholders into a prisoner's dilemma or to coerce them into voting in a particular manner. This is an example of a
decision made by the voters as a unified collective in a manner that
prevents coercive strategic voting and should be a model for our
solution.
Even when free riding and coercive strategic voting is eliminated,
a potential for holdouts remains. The larger the majority needed to
approve the merger, the greater the risk that some of the shareholders
56. Potential predators have gone one step further and implemented techniques meant to
ensure, and even exacerbate, such pressure. The two-tier discriminatory tender offer is an example of a technique that has aroused tremendous opposition. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, fl! YALE LI. 1354 (1978); Victor Brudney & Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1974).
51. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §§ 11.03, 12.02 (1984 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
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will oppose the merger in an attempt to extort a better offer. A simple majority requirement will decrease the risk of such holdouts,58 yet
for various policy considerations, certain jurisdictions have mandated
a supermajority requirement for merger approval.59

Nevertheless, it is clear that the holdout can be used against other
shareholders, as well as against the predator, in cases where a
supermajority is required to approve a merger. In Schreiber v. Carney60 a shareholder holding thirty-five percent of the company's
shares announced he was opposing a proposed merger in spite of its
desirability. His actions were sufficient to stymie the merger. He demanded a large loan from the company on preferred terms in return
for his consent. The other shareholders voted to approve the loan,
and the merger was therefore approved in a subsequent vote.
Although the loan approval was challenged, the Schreiber court upheld it, thus basically acknowledging that, given a supermajority rule,
holdouts are inevitable.
3. Share Accumulation
It is possible to take over a company by quietly accumulating its
shares on a public securities market.61 In such a takeover, shareholders have no information about the intended change of control when
selling their shares. This lack of information as to the true nature of
the transaction ensures the predator that the shareholders will not act
strategically by free riding and holding out.62 In an anonymous market trade the shareholder is unable to refrain from selling her shares
for strategic purposes so as to hold out for a larger premium, or to
take a free ride on the profit that the predator hopes to gain, because
she is unaware of the predator's intentions to take over the company.
This raises a problem regarding the appropriate division of the control
premium between the predator and the shareholders selling their
shares to her. Such silent acquisition allows the predator to pay an
especially low premium for the shares, but this is not a problem of
coerced choice. Indirectly, however, the law prevents takeovers
through share accumulation by requiring a party acquiring more than
58. See Cohen, supra note 53, at 119-25.
59. See, e.g., LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CoRPoRATIONs: ~ v AND POLICY 943 {2D ED. 1988).
60. 447 A.2d 17 {Del. Ch. 1982).
61. See generally Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 202.
62. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 352.
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five percent of a company's shares to disclose such information within
ten days. 63 In fact, as soon as the takeover intention becomes known,
holdouts and free riding come to life, at which point the predator usually changes her strategy from accumulation to a direct tender offer.
Proposals have been made to prohibit share accumulation altogether.64 It is feared that share accumulation will eliminate free
choice because shareholders will find themselves holding shares worth
even less than their pretakeover value as a result of their minority
standing. If the takeover is kept secret, however, there will be no distorted choice and the individual shareholder will only sell her shares
at a market price she thinks worthwhile. 65 Theoretically, in order to
cause shareholders to make a distorted choice, the predator must
make public her intention to acquire control by accumulating shares.
In practice, however, instead of leading to a distorted choice, such an
annonncement will cause the stock price to rise, making the takeover
more difficult (mostly due to holdouts and free riding). It is for this
reason that, even prior to the legislation requiring predators to disclose their intentions after purchasing five percent of the shares,
predators did not generally adopt this strategy but rather attempted a
direct tender offer or a merger instead.66
The difference between tender offers and share accumulation can
be viewed from another angle. In a tender offer shareholders are
aware of their mutual interdependence, whereby each shareholder's
actions affect all shareholders as a group. When considering whether
to tender her shares, each individual shareholder must take into consideration the effect of her decision on other shareholders. Therefore,
in a tender offer she may adopt a strategy of holding out or free riding. In addition, this situation could expose shareholders to techniques that could coerce them into supporting a takeover regardless of
whether or not they actually want the takeover. In short, the simple
fact that shareholders are aware of their interdependence is enough to
63. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)·(f)
(1994).
64. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 1797-99.
65. It is possible to oppose covert share accumulation because shareholders become minority shareholders without their knowledge. A similar argument that can be made against covert
share accumulation is that it is an act that deprives the shareholder, much like the deprivation
when an insider purchases shares based on inside information. Both arguments deal with giving
the shareholder equal treatment in the target company and not with guaranteeing free choice,
and they are therefore beyond the scope of this Article.
66. See Cohen, supra note 53, at 129-35.
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cause distorted choice, whether because of "natural" strategic voting
or because of an external coercive tactic exercised by the predators.
When a shareholder offers her shares on a securities exchange to
a covert predator, however, she does so without taking into account,
for better or for worse, the mutual interdependence between her actions and those of her fellow shareholders. There is no question that
the sale of her shares affects other shareholders, but because she is
unaware of her role in the takeover-regardless of the importance of
this fact in her eyes-her choice will not be distorted. From the point
of view of a shareholder selling her shares, her choice is free and independent, regardless of whether the price offered for the securities
exchange is higher or lower than the value she places on the shares.
On these grounds, I do not view covert share accumulation as a case
of distorted choice justifying intervention. The potential for coerced
choice only occurs once the predator announces her intentions. This
potential derives from the shareholders' awareness of their interdependence, and it is doubtful whether such a takeover strategy is possible. Only if adopted, however, whether of free choice or as a result of
a disclosure requirement, will it be necessary to intervene in order to
ensure free choice.
4. Reorganization of Voting Rights

The reorganization of voting rights is an excellent example of a
direct change in the shareholders' rights. In reorganizing voting
rights, one class of shares in which all shares have equal voting rights
is replaced by two new classes of shares, one of which is preferred to
the other with respect to the shares' weight in the company's capital
structure. Th.rough such a reorganization the managers, with relatively little capital investment, can centralize enough voting power in
their hands to prevent hostile takeovers.67
From the shareholders' perspective, if a company has only one
class of shares, managers cannot acquire a large enough block of
shares to prevent a takeover without making a substantial capital investment in the company.68 A situation where management controls
67. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the
Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL L. REv. 1 (1988) (describing various voting rights reorganization techniques and analyzing the problem of joint action).
68. If we assume that a block of 50% of the shares is needed in order to guarantee control,
the managers must make a capital investment of half of the company's value in order to acquire
half of the company's voting rights. Making a substantial capital investment in the company
causes the managers to align their interests with the entire company and encourages them to be
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the company with a small capital investment turns the market for corporate control into a factor that regulates management's efficiency. If
management is inefficient the company's market value will decline until the price becomes so attractive that a potential raider will purchase
control of the company and replace the management.69 The risk of
takeovers endows additional value on voting rights and guarantees
both efficient management and a premium if the company is taken
over.70 The reasonable shareholder will therefore forgo her voting
rights only in return for an appropriate premium.
However, management can cause shareholders to part with their
voting rights at a price that most of them will not consider worthwhile.71 This is possible by approaching shareholders as individuals
rather than as a group, thereby placing them in a situation of coerced
strategic voting. Let us assume that a certain company has one class
of shares, class A, and that the management owns ten percent of the
company's capital-a block of shares that is not large enough to prevent a takeover. Management is interested in guaranteeing their continued control of the company by centralizing control in their hands.
One way to attain this objective is to convert the shares held by the
public (the other ninety percent) into class B shares, in which each
block of ten shares is entitled to one vote, while at the same time
entitling the owner to a ten percent preference over class A shares
when dividends are distributed. Postconversion, the voting power of
the public holding class B shares is diluted to forty-seven percent
whereas the management, who still holds the class A shares representing only ten percent of the company's capital, controls fifty-three percent of the voting rights and is guaranteed control of the company
despite their small capital outlay.
Were such a conversion offer brought before the shareholders
general meeting it would obtain majority approval only if the majority
believed that the ten percent addition to their dividend justified forgoing their voting rights. In particular, they would consider the fact that

efficient. See William C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
69. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. F1Schel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J, L.
& ECON, 395 (1983).
70. See Manne, supra note 22.
71. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 47-56; Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange
Offers, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 153 (1988).
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management determines dividend distribution policy.72 If the majority's decision could bind the minority, the vote would be free of strategic voting. Free riding would be precluded because the group would
be forced to act as a single entity, either converting all their shares or
none at all. The same would be true of holdouts because of the requirement of a simple majority. Management could, of course,
achieve conversion in a different manner, curtailing free choice by directing the conversion offer at independent individual shareholders.
A conversion offer, as any other exchange or sale offer according
to the existing law, is not contingent on majority approval, and individual shareholders are free to act as they choose. In such a situation,
when the shareholder reaches a decision, she is aware of her interdependence with other shareholders. If she converts her shares and
other shareholders refrain from converting she will receive a larger
dividend without forgoing any meaningful voting rights, while the efficient operation of the company will be guaranteed by the continuing
potential for a takeover. If she refrains from converting her shares
while other shareholders do convert theirs, their dividend will be increased by ten percent. At the same time, this will dilute the dividend
of the individual shareholder and lower the premium offered for the
shares, as the postconversion possibility of a takeover will be much
slimmer. As a result, there will be fewer safeguards on the company's
efficiency. Thus, in both cases it will be worthwhile for all shareholders to agree to convert their shares regardless of the price offered.
Let us assume that class A shares are valued at ten dollars a share
prior to the conversion. If one individual converts her shares while
the majority does not, then the value of the individual's class B shares
will rise to twelve dollars as a result of the increased dividend and
premium, due to the continuing possibility of a takeover. However, if
the majority also converts their shares, the value of class B shares will
drop to nine dollars because of the company's potential inefficiency,
the risk of future dividends being canceled by the management, or
because of the latter's discriminatory dividend policy. In the same situation, class A shares will decrease to seven dollars because of the
company's inefficiency, the low dividend, and the slim chance of receiving a takeover premium. From the individual shareholder's point
of view, this situation represents a prisoner's dilemma:

72. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 YALE LJ. 881 {1995).
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INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CoNVERT

OPPOSE

10, 10

10, 12

CoNVERT

9, 7

9, 9

ALL OTHER VOTERS

Every shareholder will espouse one dominant strategy-convert
their shares regardless of the circumstances. Management can place
the shareholders in a prisoner's dilemma, thereby coercing them into
converting their shares, because it is able to approach shareholders as
individuals rather than as a group. In such a case the individual shareholder is asked to act independently in a matter that has clear implications for the entire group, while recognizing the interdependence
between her actions and those of other shareholders.73
5. Vote Buying
Every share has a nexus of rights that usually includes the right to
dividends, the right to vote, and the right to distribution of the company's remaining assets upon dissolution. The sale of a share transfers
the entire nexus of rights to the purchaser. The right to vote includes
the power to directly amend the share's nexus of rights through a vote
in the company's general meeting (for example, approving the conversion of class A shares into class B shares) and to indirectly affect the
share's rights by voting on matters that affect the company's business
and its shareholders, such as the decision to approve a merger. It is
assumed that a shareholder will exercise the right to vote in a manner
that takes into consideration the entire nexus of rights. Therefore, the
shareholder will only support changes that will not harm the nexus.
However, if the shareholder sells the right to vote and retains other
rights, the purchaser of the voting rights who does not have an equal
share in the corporate capital will have different considerations. The
purchaser's varying considerations create a substantial risk of making
73. Although courts have refrained from prohibiting the reorganization of voting rights,
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") adopted a rule that prohibited any variation in voting
rights between different classes of shares. See Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L REV. 119 (1987). Due to competitive
pressure from other exchanges that did not prohibit reorganization of voting rights, the NYSE
rescinded this ruling. Attempts by the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt a rule that
would prohibit reorganization of voting rights and bind all exchanges have also failed. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASH, U. L.Q. 565
(1991).
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the seller of the voting rights worse off'4 because the purchaser may
now make decisions that will dilute the value of the remaining rights
in the seller's share.75 This raises the question of why the shareholder
would sell her voting rights.
Selling a share's voting rights is an action that a shareholder undertakes independently, while recognizing that her decision is interrelated with those of other shareholders. She is therefore exposed to
strategic voting. As one individual in a large group, the manner in
which the shareholder exercises her right to vote has very little effect
on the vote's outcome.76 Moreover, in most cases the investment in
acquiring and analyzing information required to make a decision is
greater than the profit the shareholder could hope to earn by making
a "good" decision. For this reason, shareholders are indifferent to the
value of their voting rights.77 The shareholder prefers to take a free
ride on the other shareholders' investment in exercising their voting
rights.78 The right to vote is worth little to the individual shareholder,
but if shareholders were asked to vote as a group on the question of
whether to sell their voting rights, they would oppose the proposition
as long as the risk of their shares being diluted was greater than the
price being offered. This is not the case if each shareholder was asked
to sell the voting rights of her share independently from the group.
The individual shareholder does not expose herself to any risk by
selling her voting rights if other shareholders do not sell theirs because
the purchaser of the individual's voting rights will not have the power
to influence the firm's business activities or the share's nexus of rights.
If the other shareholders sell their voting rights, however, the individual shareholder who does not sell her voting rights will be a two-time
loser. Her shares will be diluted and she will forgo the premium for

74. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 69, at 410.
75. If the dilution could be capped, it would be possible to detennine the value of the
share's voting rights.
76. See, e.g., Easterbrook & FJSchel, supra note 69, at 411.
77. See Cr.ARK, supra note 22, at 390.
78. See id.
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selling the rights that she preserved. The shareholders find themselves in a prisoner's dilemma79 that will cause them to offer their voting rights at any price greater than zero.80
It is important to emphasize that vote buying is not necessarily
the outright purchase of an individual's voting rights. The right to
vote on a particular issue may also be purchased. Rather than
purchasing an irrevocable power of attorney (proxy) that allows the
purchaser to vote with the shareholder's shares in all votes, it is possible to purchase the shareholder's right to vote on a specific issue, a
situation in which the shareholder will also be faced with a coerced
choice.
The severity of the risk created by the possibility of selling voting
rights caused the courts to rule-although for reasons other than
those outlined above-against the use of vote buying. With the exception of a few special cases,81 shareholders may not sell their voting
rights separately from other rights associated with the share.82 In Delaware, however, there has recently been an apparent retreat from the
sweeping prohibition against vote buying. It is difficult to find the line
which divides legal from illegal vote buying.83 In my opinion,
although this is not the reasoning in the relevant cases, it is possible to
justify the instances in which vote buying has been permitted by showing that they did not involve a problem of coercive strategic voting.
In Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., even though the court
upheld the sweeping prohibition against vote buying, it also addressed
79. Let us assume that the value of a share is ten dollars, that the price offered for the
voting rights is two dollars, and that as a result of the expected dilution if all shareholders sell
their voting rights, the share's price will decrease to seven dollars. Every shareholder will espouse one dominant strategy, namely, to sell their voting rights under any circumstances. If the
individual shareholder sells her rights and the other shareholders do not sell theirs, the individ·
ual's situation is improved because she receives the guaranteed consideration (two dollars) and
her shares will not be diluted (twelve dollars in all as opposed to ten dollars before the sale). If
the other shareholders sell their voting rights and the individual does not, she is worse off be·
cause the expected dilution lowers the value of her shares to seven dollars. Therefore, she will
be better off mitigating her damages by selling her voting rights for the offered consideration
(nine dollars in all rather than seven). The result will be that all shareholders will sell their
voting rights, and they will all be in a position inferior (9,9} to the one in which they were prior
to the sale (10,10). The resulting matrix appears above in Part III.A.4.
80. See, e.g., Easterbrook & FISchel, supra note 69, at 411.
81. For example, voting agreements and voting trusts. On voting agreements, see Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947); on voting
trusts, see Oceanic Exploration Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1 (Del. 1981}.
82. See, e.g., Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., 352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976).
83. See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Utility of Vote Buying in the
Market for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 535, 614 (1990).
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the issue of the struggle for control within the framework of the general meeting.84 In Chew, a potential predator offered to pay ten cents
for the option to purchase shares at twenty dollars a piece, with an
irrevocable power of attorney (proxy) that would allow her to vote the
shares as she pleased even prior to exercising the option. At that time
the shares had a negative net value. As a rule, courts have ruled that
granting an irrevocable power of attorney to vote to someone who
does not have a capital interest in the share constitutes illegal vote
buying. It is accepted, however, that an option to purchase the share
gives the holder of the option an interest in the share, and she is therefore permitted to receive power of attorney to vote the share. In
Chew, due to the great difference between the strike price of the option (twenty dollars) and the market value of the shares (minus three
dollars) the real value of the option was negligible. Therefore, the
court equated payment for the option with payment for the votes, disguised so as to give the impression that the purchaser had an interest
in the shares. In its brief decision, the court found that this power of
attorney contradicted public policy, but failed to explain the reasons
for its view on vote buying as such. According to the above analysis, it
is easy to see that vote buying placed the shareholders in a situation of
coerced strategic choice. The offer was directed at all the shareholders, the consideration was greater than zero, and there was a real risk
of the shares' rights being diluted after the takeover. Therefore, it
would have been preferable to cancel the power of attorney.
The central case that started a change in this policy, Schreiber v.
Camey,85 dealt with a merger. In Schreiber, a company made a loan
to a shareholder who controlled thirty-five percent of the company's
stock in order to persuade him not to oppose a pending merger. The
other shareholders approved the loan by a vast majority.86 The court
recognized that what had taken place was actually a payment for his
votes, which usually constitutes vote buying, but the court chose not to
interfere. The Schreiber court reasoned that vote buying per se is not
illegal unless it is unfair or is meant to dispossess or defraud the other
shareholders.87 Because the merger was shown to be in the shareholders' best interest and the fairness of the vote purchase was evident

84. See Chew, 352 A.2d at 426.
85. 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982).
86. See id. at 20.
87. See id. at 25.
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from the vast majority of shareholders who supported it, the court
ruled that vote buying was legal in this case.88
An analysis of the above case reveals that the shareholder was
not placed in a prisoner's dilemma. The offer to purchase votes was
made to one individual shareholder who held a large block of stock
and knew that his vote would determine the outcome. Furthermore,
the majority of the other shareholders advocated the merger. Moreover, the merger did not create a risk that the shareholders' rights
would be diluted in the future. As noted, these factors actually set the
scene for a holdout. The very fact that the shareholder who "sold" his
shares was able to undertake a strategy of holding out completely contradicts both the prisoner's dilemma and any other type of pressure
that would force him to sell his vote. Therefore, the court justifiably
refrained from cancelling the loan as a form of illegal vote buying.
Later, in Wincorp Realty Investments, Inc. v. Goodtab, Inc., 89 the
Delaware court again approved vote buying, this time in the context
of a battle for control. In the context of a takeover battle, a major
shareholder gave a potential raider who was trying to get elected to
the board of directors a ninety-day option to purchase all his shares at
$41.50 a share. The option included an irrevocable power of attorney
(proxy) to vote his shares. In consideration, the shareholder received
$20,000, with a promised $17,000 bonus if the raider was elected to the
board.90 It was argued that these payments were made solely in exchange for the votes. The stock's price at the time was $30 and the
chance that the stock's price would rise forty percent over the next
three months was almost nonexistent. The court did not accept this
argument, ruling that as long as the payment is not exclusively for
votes and there is some additional justification for the payment, the
court will lean towards noninterference.91 In this case the court found
that the option was real and that its purchase gave the raider an interest in the shares. Moreover, the transaction was initiated by the
shareholder. He was actually prepared to sell his shares but did not
agree to the price offered and instead offered the option. In the
court's opinion these facts supported the claim that the sale of the
option was a real economic transaction rather than an attempt to disguise vote buying.92
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id. at 26.
8 Del. J. Corp. L. 636 (Del. Ch. 1983).
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 642-43.
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As for myself, I am prepared to accept the reasonable argument
that the option was of very little value, if any, and the bulk of the
payment was in consideration for the shares' voting rights. According
to the above analysis, however, it would still make sense to permit the
transaction because the situation raises no suspicion that the sale was
caused by coerced strategic voting. Rather than an offer directed at
all the shareholders, there was one major shareholder offering to sell
the right to vote his shares in a private transaction. When determining
the price in such a transaction, the shareholder does not take her interdependence with other shareholders into account because other
shareholders are not faced with an offer to sell their voting rights. Her
decision is unhindered.

In most private transactions involving the sale of voting rights by
large shareholders there is no risk of coerced choice for a number of
reasons. First, if a shareholder who desires to sell her voting rights
initiates a transaction, there is no fear that the purchaser has coerced
her into selling her shares. Second, even if the purchaser initiates the
transaction, there is no real risk of coerced choice if a similar offer has
not been made to other shareholders. There is no interdependence
between the shareholders and, therefore, no need to choose strategically. It is important to emphasize, however, that the seller will find
herself in a position of coerced choice if the purchaser of the voting
rights intends to purchase them from other shareholders if he cannot
secure them from her. Moreover, the seller will be in a position of
coerced choice if the purchaser is interested in purchasing more voting
rights later rather than in an offer at the same time and her intentions
are known. Third, unlike the small shareholder whose ability to influence a vote is negligible, a large shareholder is aware that she has the
power to influence the decision through her vote. From her point of
view, the right to vote has definite value. The potential to profit from
a correct decision or to lose from an incorrect decision is quite significant. The effect of a potential dilution as a result of the sale of voting
rights is much greater for large shareholders. Thus, large shareholders
will not easily consent to a coerced choice and forgo their voting rights
for an unacceptable price.93 Because the risk of coerced choice in private sales of voting rights by large shareholders is slim, these transactions should be permitted.94 However, in offers to purchase voting
93. However, such a transaction should be governed by fiduciary duties. See infra note 133.
94. In addition to Goodtab and Schreiber, which were mentioned above, see Weinberger v.
Bankston, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l[ 93,539 (Del. Ch. 1987) (involving a settlement whereby a
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rights directed at all the shareholders, coerced choice is almost
unavoidable.95
B.

PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS

The essential difference between preferred and common shares is
that preferred shares have preference over common shares. Preferred
shares are a combination between a stock and a bond. On the one
hand, preferred shares entitle their holders to a fixed regular dividend
that, when dividends are paid, is given preference over common
shares, similar to the preference given to interest payments made on
bonds. On the other hand, as it is for a common share, the company's
obligation to pay the dividend to the preferred shares is not unconditional. Because declaring a dividend depends on the judgment of the
board of directors, who owe a fiduciary duty to the common shareholders, there is a risk that the board of directors might infringe on
the preferred shareholders' right to a dividend. Therefore, preferred
shares are usually accumulating; any dividend that is not distributed
accumulates for the preferred shareholders and, as long as it is not
paid out in full, dividends may not be distributed to the common
shareholders. So, for example, a company that made no profits over
several years would show a debt to the preferred shareholders in its
financial statements, which would increase as timJ goes by. If, in a
given year, the company made a large profit, the common shareholders would not be permitted to distribute this profit among themselves
until they had paid off the accumulated dividends. However, usually
the value of the accumulated dividends would be greater than all the
profits for that year, preventing any distribution to the common
shares. Occasionally, it takes a few profitable years to pay off the accumulated dividend. This creates an incentive for both management
and the common shareholders to employ tactics that will allow the
large shareholder gave the managers a proxy in exchange for financial remuneration). In general, most agreements customarily referred to as "greenmail" or "standstill agreements" are
agreements to purchase voting rights from large shareholders. Despite the permissive view
above, however, these agreements raise serious problems vis-a-vis the fiduciary duty owed .to
other shareholders, which have nothing to do with coerced choice and are sufficient to justify
prohibiting such transactions. See, e.g., Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN,
EcoN. 275 (1983); Steven A. Baronoff, Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote
Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93 YALE L.J. 1093 (1984). These agreements are beyond
the scope of this discussion.
95. For an article that expresses the opinion that vote buying should be allowed in such
cases, see Andre, supra note 83.
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distribution of dividends to common shareholders while circumventing their obligation to pay the accumulated dividends to the preferred shareholders.
One of the techniques is to attain the "agreement" of the preferred shareholders to postpone payment of the accumulated dividend
through the use of coerced choice. The following is an example of
such a situation, based on Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp. 96 A large
one-time profit created an opportunity for the company to distribute a
sizable dividend to the shareholders, if only the obligation to pay off
the accumulated dividend that was owed to the preferred shareholders
could be canceled. Were the preferred shareholders asked to vote on
the question of whether to cancel the accumulated dividend for the
sole purpose of allowing the common shareholders to receive a dividend, they would surely be opposed. Such a proposition would only
be approved if the preferred shareholders were offered appropriate
compensation for forgoing their rights to a dividend. 97
No such compensation was offered in Barrett. The common
shareholders, however, were able to extract such a concession from
the preferred shareholders through the use of coercive strategic voting. A new class of nonaccumulating preferred stock was issued by
the company. The new stock had a registered capital equal to the
value of the registered capital of the preferred stock plus the proportionate value of the accumulated dividend, paid a dividend equal to
the preferred shares, and was given preference over the preferred
shares in the distribution of dividends. 98 These shares were then offered to all the preferred shareholders in place of their preferred
shares. On its face, such an exchange did not appear worthwhile to
the preferred shareholders. The new shares were not accumulating,
meaning their future value would be affected if the company decided
not to distribute a dividend. 99 Moreover, the accumulated dividend
would have been paid upon the first distribution of the company's
profits, whereas with the new shares the accumulated dividend became part of the registered capital, which would only be distributed to
the shareholders in the event of the company's dissolution. Not only
did it defer payment of the dividend for an indefinite period of time,
but if the time ever came, there would probably not be enough cash
96.
97.
98.
99.

146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944).

Id. at 703-04.
Id.

See, e.g., Guttmann v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 927 (2d. Cir. 1951).
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left over to make the payment. The real meaning of deferring the
dividend is to cancel the accumulated dividends.
Even though such an offer is clearly not worthwhile for the preferred shareholder, he will find himself in a dilemma. If he refrains
from converting his preferred shares into the new preferred shares,
and if the other preferred shareholders do convert their shares, he will
be subordinated to the new shareholders and will find himself in an
inferior position if and when a dividend is distributed. The more preferred shareholders capitulate to the conversion, the worse his situation will become. If he does convert his shares, he will be given
preference over those who did not in the present distribution of dividends, but he will forgo t4e chance to receive the accumulated dividend in the near future. 100 Let us assume that the original preferred
shares are worth ten dollars each and the new ones are only worth six
dollars each because they are not accumulating and the accumulated
dividends are deferred to dissolution, if paid at all. Similarly, if many
shareholders convert their old preferred shares for new ones, the old
preferred shares will decline to two dollars in value due to their subordination in the distribution of dividends in the future. This situation is
demonstrated in the following matrix of the coordination problem:
INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CONVERT

OPPOSE

10, 10

10, 6

CONVERT

6,2

6, 6

ALL OTHER VOTERS

Unlike the prisoner's dilemma, the individual shareholder has no
dominant strategy. His position is dependent on the other shareholders. If the remainder of the shareholders in the group oppose the conversion, the individual shareholder will oppose the conversion and all
the shareholders will benefit (10, 10). If a majority of the other shareholders convert their shares, however, the individual shareholder will
also convert his shares in order to mitigate his damages (6 rather than
2). If all shareholders possessed perfect information as to the expected profit in every situation and about the information in possession of the other shareholders, then the equilibrium point would
100. It should be pointed out that the preference in receiving dividends is meaningless: If
shareholders do not convert their shares to new shares, there will be no group that is given
preference over the old preferred shareholders who, in any event, had preference over common
shareholders.
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clearly be that a majority of shareholders would oppose the proposed
conversion. Alternatively, if the shareholders could communicate between themselves, even without a formal meeting, they would coordinate a strategy of opposition because that would be most beneficial
for all. Shareholders, of course, do not have perfect informationespecially about the ability and information possessed by other shareholders-and because they are thinly spread out, informal coordination is difficult. 101
Every shareholder, then, will calculate a matrix for himself based
on what he sees as the probability of other shareholders converting
their shares. The greater the difference between the value of the new
share and the value of the old one in the event of a successful conversion attempt, the smaller the required probability that other shareholders will convert in order to convince the individual shareholder to
convert his shares and mitigate the damages. To emphasize the damage that may be caused to those who refuse to convert, it is usually
stipulated that conversion will not be allowed at a later stage, and the
offer to convert is usually "now or never." The result, similar to Barrett, is that the majority of shareholders are forced to convert their
shares because the group would otherwise be worse off than they
would had they refused to do so. The common shareholders thus
achieve their goal-cancellation of the accumulated dividend for no
consideration-and pave the way for distributing a dividend to
themselves.
C.

BONDHOLDERS

Companies that have collapsed or stand on the brink of collapse
due to debt usually look to reorganize their capital structure and minimize their debt. Occasionally, their plans include asking the existing
bondholders to convert their bonds for stock. Their bonds are sometimes paid off with new capital infused into the company by third parties. Whether the reorganization plan includes reorganizing the
relative claims of those who have claims against the company or granting rights to new participants, the proclaimed goal is to increase the
101. Practically, it would be sufficient for the preferred shareholders to "think that other
shareholders think" there is a risk that other shareholders will convert in order to cause any
coordination to fail. But if a preferred shareholder is aware that the entire "trick" is meant to
allow the distribution of dividends to common shareholders, it will not be worthwhile to convert
because, in order to distribute any dividend to common shareholders, the preferred shareholder
must first be paid his accumulated dividend in full.
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company's :financial strength for the benefit of all creditors and
shareholders.
1.

Tender Offers

The most common type of reorganization involves an offer to the
bondholders, in the form of a tender offer, to convert their bonds for
cash, for bonds with a lower interest rate, for stock, or for some combination of all three. Because these cases usually involve high risk
bonds in a company that is undergoing :financial difficulties, the bonds
often trade at a substantial discount. For this reason, the tender or
conversion offers are usually made at a price that expresses a fraction
of the claim embodied in the bond itself, that is, less than one hundred
percent of the par value but greater than the market value of the
bond. 102
Such a tender offer, directed at the bondholders as individuals in
a group rather than at the group itself, causes them to vote strategically, implementing one of two tactics. The first is the holdout,
namely, a refusal to convert their bonds in the hopes that the price of
the tender offer will be increased or that other members of the group
or other groups will forgo part of their. profit in the bondholder's favor
while threatening to force the company into bankruptcy by their refusal. The second is free riding, namely, refraining from offering their
bonds in the hopes that others will offer theirs and facilitate a reorganization that would improve the company's :financial situation and
eventually allow the bonds to be redeemed at their par value. These
two mechanisms can stymie the reorganization of the capital structure
in a leveraged company.

In practice, if s11ch plans are brought before the bondholders'
meeting so that the majority's decision would bind all bondholders,
strategic voting could be eliminated. However, the 1939 Trust Indenture Act requires a unanimous vote to alter any rights relating to a
bond's principal or interest payments, as opposed to other conditions
in the bond's trust indenture. 103 This fact alone eliminates any possibility of ratifying amendments to the bond's par value or coupon
rate-which are imperative to any reorganization-at the bondholders meeting. The holdout's power is so great that the chances of receiving the needed majority are infinitesimal. As a result, it is more
102. See supra note 14.
103. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (1994).
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convenient for a company to address the problem of strategic voting
than to attempt to obtain unanimous consent from the bondholders.
As in the situations above, the way to deal with strategic voting is
to take advantage of it to pressure bondholders to convert their
bonds, particularly by placing bondholders in a situation whereby strategic voting coerces them to convert their bonds regardless of the circumstances. There are many different techniques to achieve this
desired effect. In all of them the goal is to cause the bondholder who
did not convert her bonds along with other bondholders to be worse
off.104
This discussion focuses on the most potent aspect of strategic voting techniques: the exit consent offer. In addition to the bond's principal and interest rates, every bond has additional protective covenants
that are set forth in its trust indenture.105 These protective covenants
may be amended, depending on the circumstances, either by a regular
majority or by a supermajority vote, as opposed to the one-hundredpercent majority required to amend the par value or coupon rate.
Stripping the bond's various defenses-for example, the condition
that no additional or preferred bonds be issued, or the cancellation or
replacement of a bond's security, such as the replacement of a specific
charge with a floating charge-increases the risk inherent in the bond,
thereby decreasing its value.106 On the one hand, both increasing the
majority needed for early redemption in the· event of a delay or of
nonpayment and decreasing the majority required to amend the trust
indenture prevent the possibility of requiring early redemption. On
the other hand, they ease future amendments that might decrease the
bond's value. 107 Stripping the bonds of their protective covenants
leads to a decrease in the value of bonds that were not converted prior
to these amendments.
The bondholders are asked to vote for these amendments. But
why should bondholders agree to amendments that lead to a decrease
in the bonds' value? The answer is simple: A tender offer is made to
the bondholders, structured so as to place the bondholders in a strategic voting situation through the use of a tender offer that will coerce
them to "consent." This offer stipulates that any bondholder wishing
104. For a description of these coercion techniques, see Andrew Laurance Bab, Note, Debt
Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 846, 850 (1991).
105. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis
of Bond Covenants, 1 J. FIN. EcoN. 117 (1979).
106. See id.
107. See Bab, supra note 104, at 853.
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to tender her bonds must agree to vote for certain amendments before
she is permitted to tender. In other words, a precondition for receiving any consideration in the tender offer is that the bondholder wishing to "exit" the group must first "consent" to an amendment to the
rights of the group she is about to exit. It is clear that an exiting bondholder who will not be affected by the results of her vote takes into
account different factors than do bondholders who are not exiting.
Every bondholder will find herself in a dilemma. Although she cannot know how other bondholders will act, there is a possibility that
they will consent. If the bondholder tenders her bonds, she will receive a premium above market value. If the bondholder does not
tender her bonds, while all other bondholders do tender theirs and
vote for the proposed amendments when exiting, the individual bondholder will be left with bonds that have been stripped of their protective covenants and are now worth less than they were prior to the
offer. Hence, even if the bondholder believes that the bonds are
worth more than the offer, she is forced to agree to the offer out of
fear that other bondholders will convert (whether because of a mistake due to lack of information, or because they believe that the offer
is worthwhile to them).108
108. Let us assume that the par value of a bond is ten dollars and that the bond is trading at
four dollars, which is 40% of its par value. The tender offer is five dollars cash for a bond, but
the bondholder believes the issue is worth six dollars a bond. If the bond's protective covenants
are canceled, its worth will decrease to three dollars. The individual bondholder does not have
complete information, and she does not know if other bondholders value the bonds as she does
(six dollars) or at the market price (four dollars). It is clear that if, for whatever reasons, other
bondholders value the bonds at market price, they will convert their bonds, and if they value the
bond as the individual does, they will not convert. Therefore, in terms of probability two matrixes exist:
MATRIX A
INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CONVERT

OPPOSE

6, 6

6, 6

CoNVERT

5, 3

5, 5

ALL OTiiER VOTERS

MATRIXB

INDIVIDUAL VOTER
OPPOSE

CONVERT

OPPOSE

4,6

4, 6

CoNVERT

5, 3

5,5

ALL OnmR VoTERS

The bondholder adopts the following reasoning: If I offer, I receive five dollars. If I oppose,
however, I may be left with a bond worth three dollars, according to the probability that other
bondholders will convert their bonds. Every voter will make a matrix for herself according to
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Occasionally, however, despite a company's efforts to strip its
bonds of their defenses, the company is still unable to drive the bond's
value down below the price at which it was trading prior to the offer.
This happens when a company is in such serious financial trouble that
its bonds are already trading at a low price, which reflects the low
value that investors place on the protective covenants. Although
stripping the bonds of their protective covenants decreases their
value, the chances for increased financial stability due to the removal
of the bonds' protective covenants may actually increase the bonds'
value. In the event that removing the bonds' protective covenants
does not prevent a rise in price above the one offered in the tender
offer, free riding will prevail, causing the offer to fail. 109
Although the exit consent offer causes coerced choice, it was permitted by the Delaware court in Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc..110 In
Katz, the offer was priced so as to represent a premium to all classes
of bondholders relative to the market price at which their bonds were
trading but lower than their par value. The offer was conditioned
upon the consent of a majority of the preferred bondholders and at
least two-thirds of the subordinate bondholders. All bondholders who
wished to offer their bonds were required to vote for the rescission of
the protective covenants on all the bonds. It was argued, inter alia,
that this technique coerced the bondholders into consenting to the offer in any event because of the fear that other bondholders would
consent to stripping their bonds of all their protective covenants, as
exiting bondholders lose interest in the fate of those remaining. The
courts rejected this argument, stating there was no contractual prohibition against such an offer and whoever did not want to consent to it
was not bound to do so. If it is assumed, however, that the offer was
too low and benefitted the shareholders at the expense of the bondholders, it can be shown that the bondholders were faced with a strategic voting situation that coerced them into offering their bonds in
any event.111
the probability she assigns to every situation. As the difference between the offered price and
the price of the stripped bond increases, the smaller the probability needed that other bondholders will convert to cause the voter to choose conversion. All bondholders weigh this factor, and
all bondholders are aware that other bondholders are weighing this factor, and are therefore
forced to convert their bonds.
109. See Bab, supra note 104, at 880.
110. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
111. See supra note 108. This is not a prisoner's dilemma. If. however, the parties had perfect information, or if they were able to communicate among themselves, their opposition would
be guaranteed because it would be the strategy preferred by all.
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In principle, the general argument presented by the court in Katz
does not stand to reason. The statement that "every bondholder is
free to reject or accept the offer" ignores the fact that the bondholder
is left with no real choice because any bondholder who opposes will
find herself injured by the cancellation of the bonds' protective covenants by those bondholders who are exiting. In this case, however, the
court's ruling was justified, as may be learned from a footnote pointing out that the various bonds were held by a few large and sophisticated investors.112 In such a case bondholders can easily overcome
the problems of collective action and coordinate an optimal plan of
action among themselves. However, the fact that the judgment did
not address the special situation at hand allowed the adoption of the
exit consent offer as a legitimate technique, even when the bondholders are small, diverse, and widespread.

2. Vote Buying
In that same year, based partially on Katz, the Delaware court
handed down its ruling in Kass v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 113 The court
approved a technique of direct acquisition of bondholders' voting
rights in order to vote for the cancellation of protective covenants in
the bonds. To simplify, in the course of reorganizing the company's
debt, bondholders were asked to vote for the cancellation of protective covenants in their favor, without a tender offer or exchange offer;
that is, there was no exiting. It was clear that bondholders would only
vote in favor if offered the appropriate consideration in exchange for
forgoing their protective covenants. In place of collective consideration to the group for forgoing the protective covenants, however, the
company offered an individual payment to any bondholder voting in
favor, thus causing a strategic voting situation that coerced all bondholders into consenting in any event.114
112. See Katz, 508 A.2d at 878 n.6.
113. 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 1074 (Del. Ch. 1986).
114. Let us assume that a bond is trading at ten dollars. The proposed cancellation will
cause its value to decrease to seven dollars. Any consideration less than three dollars should be
rejected by the voters. However, because of the coerced choice, the required majority will be
attained to cancel the protective covenants, even if each bondholder is offered only two dollars.
The matrix in Part III.A.4. will obtain.
Every bondholder has one dominant strategy: to vote in favor. If other bondholders oppose
the protective covenants will not be canceled and the bond will maintain its value (ten dollars),
whereas a vote in support will allow the bondholder to receive an additional two dollars (twelve
dollars in all). If other bondholders vote in favor, the protective covenants will be canceled and
the bonds' value will drop to seven dollars. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to mitigate the
damages and receive the additional two dollars offered for a vote in favor (nine dollars in all).
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As noted, the court also approved this technique and, in so doing,
rejected the argument that vote buying was illegal. To the court, the
prohibition against purchasing votes to stocks is based, inter alia, on a
fiduciary duty that does not exist between bondholders and is therefore inapplicable.115
IV. DEMOCRACY OR DICTATORSHIP: THE CASE LAW
In general, the courts have permitted the use of techniques that
create coercive voting situations. With the exception of shareholder
vote buying, which has been prohibited, the use of coercive voting
techniques has been approved in all other instances, including bondholder vote buying. The exposure of free and democratic voting to
the forces of "natural" strategic voting formed the background for the
court's decision to allow dictatorial strategic voting-coerced strategic
voting that enables an interested party to dictate the result of a vote.
In this manner, for instance, the courts have approved two-tier
discriminatory tender offers, in spite of the coercive choice involved.116 On the other hand, after recognizing the coercive element
introduced by these mechanisms, the courts "compensated" by permitting the use of defense tactics in such takeover situations.117 Indeed, permitting the use of such defensive tactics against takeover
attempts prevents coerced choice.118 However, in authorizing actions
that may also frustrate future takeover attempts, the courts have, in a
sense, "thrown the baby out with the bath water." More problematic
is the fact that, by authorizing the use of such defensive tactics, the
courts have eliminated the most important advantage of the tender
offer-the ability to circumvent management and approach the shareholders directly. Defensive tactics are adopted and used by the very
management that the party initiating the takeover intends to
replace. 119
The voters find themselves in a prisoner's dilemma that pressures them to vote in favor of a
decision they all oppose.
115. See Katz, 508 A.2d at 880..Sl.
116. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See also
supra note 56 and accompanying text
117. Id. at 956-57.
118. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 307-17 (1983); Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 53 (1985).
119. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson,
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Legal restraints on the ability of companies to amend certain covenants in a bond's trust indenture without the consent of all bondholders greatly hamper these companies' ability to restructure their debt in
troubled times. As a result, companies are essentially helpless in the
face of holdouts because, even if such a vote could bind the minority,
it could never receive the necessary majority support. The need to
enable companies to restructure their debts and improve their financial situation was recognized by the courts, which consequently sanctioned the use of coercive voting systems. The courts' approval,
however, was not limited to this specific use, so nothing stands in the
way of a company that wishes to use these coercive voting systems to
dispossess its bondholders, even when there is no justification for
straying from the normal unimpeded vote.120
Due to various policy considerations, the legislature decided to
adopt a unanimity requirement for certain changes. The assumption
underlying the court's sanctioning of the avoidance of the unanimity
requirement through coercive voting is that it would be preferable to
change this requirement. It is questionable, however, that this is desirable legal policy. The courts' rulings are not without problems.
First, they grant unbridled power to one party to the contract to dictate the "preferred" amendments to the contract, thereby enabling the
company to dispossess bondholders unjustly. Second, they remove
some of the pressure from the legislature to change the law. If there
were no other way to get around the unanimity rule, companies would
avoid holdouts by filing for bankruptcy. In the context of bankruptcy
proceedings, a supermajority vote can force bondholders who were
holding out to accept a reorganization. 121 Assuming this is a more
expensive alternative, it would provide an incentive to create a lobby
for changing the law.
Beyond the criticism of courts' specific decisions, the problem of
coercive voting may be viewed on a more fundamental level. Specifically, the very use of coercive voting distorts the nature of the voting
system as a tool for expressing true group preference by determining
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REv. 819 (1981).

120. For example, in restructuring debt, allowing coerced choice in order to circumvent the
100% majority requirement for amending the bonds principal and interest rates led to the allowance of coercive vote buying. Through this allowance, bondholders' protective covenants were
eliminated when there was no reason for them not to have been decided by a simple majority
without any coercive tactic being involved. See Kass v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 12 Del. J. Corp. L.
1074 (Del. Ch. 1986).
121. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1247.
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the results of the vote in advance. In such a situation, even though the
required majority has been attained through a vote, it is impossible to
know if the resulting transaction will be efficient and whether it accurately reflects group preference. By allowing the use of coercive tactics, the courts have, in essence, taken the position that the
transactions at hand are efficient. In other words, approving the use
of bondholder vote buying to bring about the cancellation of protective covenants in a trust indenture is tantamount to the courts taking
the position that it would be preferable to cancel such covenants.
Therefore, it appears that in the choice between democracy, with all
its drawbacks, and dictatorship, which derives from the ability to force
a desired result in a vote, the courts have given their stamp of approval to dictatorship.
The distinction between democracy and dictatorship is, in fact,
akin to the distinction between a liability rule and a property rule. 122
A property rule protection provides that transfer or change of an entitlement can only be executed through a consensual transaction based
on the seller's subjective valuation of the entitlement. A liability rule
protection provides that transfer or change of an entitlement can be
forced upon the owner by anyone willing to pay the objective value of
the entitlement as determined by the courts. The protection afforded
to securities holders against third parties can be viewed as either a
property rule-the unimpeded vote-or a liability rule-permitted
coerced voting.
A restriction on coercive voting allows securities holders to make
collective decisions and form group preference. Consequently, anyone wishing to transact with the group must acquire its consent (majority vote), based on the group's subjective valuation of the
transaction (group preference). Such a restriction provides holders of
securities ,vith a property-rule-type protection. On the other hand,
allowing coercive voting enables interested parties to force the transaction on the group. There is no need for true consent. One might
argue that this is a liability rule. 123 But in a true liability rule, once the
transaction is forced, there is a complementary right to ask the court
to determine the objective value of the transaction, while here the
value of the transaction is determined by the same party who forces
the transaction. By allowing coercive voting then, the courts have left
122. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20.
123. See David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in
Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REv. 701, 705-06 n.7 (1987).
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securities holders without the crucial complementary right to ask for
objective valuation of the transaction, leaving the group at the mercy
of the coercing party.
The courts justify their position through the use of strict contractual interpretation, while rejecting the applicability of the good faith
doctrine. In one case a trust indenture that could only be amended by
a majority decision was interpreted to allow the use of coercive mechanisms such as the "exit consent" offer.124 The court reasoned that a
trust indenture that does not specifically prohibit coercive voting
should be interpreted as permitting the use of coercive voting. Moreover, the court reasoned that the exploitation of the "right" to use
coercive mechanisms should not be interpreted as a lack of good faith.
With all due respect, there is no justification for allowing such an
obvious and glaring distortion of the voting system, particularly in securities contracts and corporate bylaws executed before coercive voting mechanisms became so widespread. The fact that bondholders did
not foresee the use of coercive voting systems requires the court to fill
in the gaps left in the original contracts. Such completion should, of
course, be done in a manner consistent with what the parties would
have agreed upon at the time that the contract was executed had they
taken this eventuality into consideration.125 It is hard to envision a
situation in which the bondholders would have agreed to the use of
"exit consent" offers or vote buying had they considered these possibilities when negotiating the contract. We may compare this to a
situation in which the parties to a contract agreed between themselves
that the fate of any proposed amendments to the contract should be
decided by the toss of a coin. Would we even consider allowing the
party tossing the coin to use a trick coin just because in the contract
the parties did not address the issue of the type of coin to be used? It
goes ,vithout saying that the parties intended the coin to be free of any
distortions. The same is true for a voting system stipulating that decisions be made by a majority vote. The very fact that a vote is required
clearly indicates that the parties intended the system to operate free
from any external influence or pressures. This is the spirit of the contract, and the contract's interpretation should express this, whether by
interpreting the parties' silence as a prohibition or by filling in the
"gaps" in accordance with the parties' intentions. Similarly, the idea

124. See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
125. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoN"I"RAcrs 547 (2d ed. 1990).
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that the voting system should be free from external influences can also
be implied from the doctrine of good faith performance in contract.126

V. RECOMMENDED POLICY: GUARANTEEING
FREE CHOICE
A.

THE SOLUTION:

A

BINDING VOTE

After examining a variety of coercive voting situations, it appears
that "natural" strategic voting and coerced strategic voting are simply
two sides of the same coin: Both are inherent in the voting system and
both have the potential to distort the results of a vote.
As noted, having set the insurance of transaction-efficiency as our
goal and having adopted group preference and the vote as the tools
for achieving this goal, the free and unhindered operation of the voting system must be guaranteed. Othenvise, it will be impossible to
determine whether or not the majority's opinion accurately expresses
"group preference." Therefore, it is of utmost importance that we
guarantee the freedom of the voting system from the distorting effects
of strategic voting, regardless of whether the distortion is caused by an
outside force (as in the prisoner's dilemma or the coordination problem) or whether it is internal and created by the individual voters'
actions (as in the free rider problem and the holdout). In both instances, there is a real danger that majority opinion will not reflect
group preference. This will result both in the acceptance of inefficient
transactions and in the rejection of desired transactions. Any attempt
to "free" the voting system will necessitate addressing all the strategic
voting situations examined above.
1. Holdouts

In many instances, the holdout is considered a legitimate business
maneuver-the exercise of power and bargaining ability in order to
affect the distribution of a given surplus from a transaction. The
holdout is based on its initiator's desire to see the transaction take
place. This is the reality in many transactions in which the parties to
the transactions are individuals rather than a group. We do not consider rigid bargaining unacceptable because we are unable to determine whether the bargainer's position is a holdout or just a reaction to
126. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HAR.v. L. REv. 369 (1980).
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an undesirable offer and, also, because in market economics the manner in which the profit is divided between the parties is not important
as long as efficient transactions are taking place. A similar situation
occurs with voter groups. This is especially true when members of the
group attempt to hold out in order to force a transaction that is beneficial for the entire group.127 Problems arising due to a holdout within
a group of voters are essentially the result of one part of the group
seeking an unequal division of the profits between themselves and the
rest of the group. In these instances, however, even the initiators of
the holdout are ultimately interested in completing the transaction. In
short, holdouts do not distort the group's preference, they influence
price.
Although holdouts do not present a critical problem, they do require a solution. In my view, the appropriate solution is simple majority rule. The simple majority is the minimal number of voters
necessary to learn about the group's preference to change the status
quo. It is-also the optimal number for preventing holdouts. The minority voter will not feel that she has the ability to obstruct a decision
when a simple majority is all that is required for a vote to be passed.128
2.

The Free Rider, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Coordination Problems

The free rider problem is much more complicated. Although the
free rider seeks the other voters' support for the transaction, she opposes it. At no point in time is the free rider interested in consenting
to the transaction. In situations when free riding is possible, there is a
high probability that efficient transactions will fail. In short, free riding distorts group preference.
127. Nevertheless, even if ex post such a holdout is successful (the bidder increased her
offer), it is still inefficient as an ex ante move. In their vote those who support the transaction
express their assessment both about the desirability of the deal and the possibility of holding out
and getting a better offer. If the majority supports the deal, there is no reason to assume that the
minority position stating that a profitable holdout is possible is "correct" Statistically, the minority is wrong and the whole group risks losing the deal.
128. Even if a simple majority rule is accepted, holdouts will still be possible. The holdout's
power depends on the share of the individual holding out in the percentage of securities holders
participating in the vote. For example, if all voters participate in the vote, a participant who
holds 10% of the aggregate voting rights is unable to prevent the vote from being passed by
holding out But if only 19% of the eligible securities holders participate in a vote, and the 10%
owner is among them, then she will have the ability to hold out Without her support, a simple
majority cannot be achieved. In spite of this weakness, the simple majority rule is still the lesser
of two evils, as it is the smallest majority that still ensures efficient decisioumaking.
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This Article considers two possible solutions to the free rider

problem. One proposes restricting the free rider's ability to act independently of the rest of the group. The other involves curtailing the
free rider's ability to share in the profit derived by the party offering
the transaction. 129 If we adopt the first solution, the free rider's ability
to act independently of the group is restricted by making the transaction conditional on the response of all involved, or by deciding that
the majority's decision will bind the entire group to take the same
course of action. This solution frustrates the individual's ability to
take a free ride. The second possible solution restricts the free rider's
competence to share in the bidder's profit. This gives the initiator of
the transaction the power to discriminate between herself and the
other partners-the free riders. This solution removes the incentive to
be a free rider. There is a concrete difference between these two alternatives. The second option, which removes the individual's incentive to be a free rider, also opens the door to coercive strategic
voting. 130 This is not the case with the first option, which precludes
the individual's ability to be a free rider.
I propose adopting the following rule as a solution to the free
rider problem. My rule will create a voting system that will both bind
all of the voters to the majority's decision and obligate them to act
accordingly. Such a rule will allow coordination between the voters,
while at the same time preventing the individual voter from acting
independently of the group. This will eliminate the individual's ability
to be a free rider. Moreover, my rule offers a solution to both the
coordination problem and the prisoner's dilemma because the vote
facilitates both coordination and a binding agreement. 131
B.

PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SOLUTION

In order to implement the proposed solution, we must be able to
identify situations in which strategic voting has repercussions for the
129. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 16.
130. For example: a two-tier discriminatory tender offer.
131. However, a rule that enables voters to coordinate their positions would be sufficient to
solve the coordination problem. In order to solve the free rider problem and the prisoner's
dilemma problem, the rule must also include a mechanism that requires the individual to act in
accordance with the majority, thus preventing her from acting independently of the group. It
appears that the coordination problem may be solved without binding the minority to act in
accordance with the majority, but there is a practical reason for applying the rule to both situations. Adopting a solution that incorporates both elements eliminates the need to determine
which instance falls into which group.
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entire group. Because strategic voting occurs in a wide variety of situations, this may not be as easy as it seems. Let us begin with several
distinguishing characteristics of strategic voting.
First, and most crucially, there must be a general offer made to a
group of individuals, each of whom is free to vote as they wish. For
example, a tender offer or an exchange offer for securities is a general
offer to all securities holders in a group to offer up their securities
individually. Similarly, in vote buying there is an offer of consideration that each voter is asked to accept individually.132 Second, some
interdependence must exist among the voters as to the benefit they
can expect to derive from their decision. In order to identify this factor it is important to draw the line that differentiates between decisions and actions that a securities holder may make independently and
decisions and actions that may only be endorsed if enjoying majority
support. The theoretical principle is clear: any actions that have externalities for the group as a whole must be conditioned upon the receipt
of majority approval. For instance, the sale of shares during regular
trading on a securities exchange will have no effect on the rights of
other shareholders. On the other hand, the sale of shares during a
change of control could turn the other shareholders into a minority
group that can be deprived of its rights by the party initiating the
takeover. 133
132. Occasionally, an offer that is not directed at all the voters can cause a coerced choice,
for example, an offer made to a specific individual in the group wherein she is told that a similar
offer will be made to the other voters, one at a time, in the future. The individual's decision will
be affected by her assessment of how the others who come after her may respond, and her vote
may therefore still be coerced.
133. In a one-time offer to an individual securities holder, there is no problem of mutual
dependency. Therefore, no risk of coerced voting exists. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the action that the securities holder wishes to take will possibly have an affect on the
entire group. In such a situation, however, the risk of damaging the rest of the group can be
alleviated by various other legal defenses, such as the good faith doctrine and fiduciary duties.
For example, a shareholder who owns a controlling block of shares and sells them to another
may act independently, although her actions affect other shareholders in that they are now subject to the control of another party. This is because of the view that shareholders do not have a
special right vis-a-vis the controlling shareholder as to its identity, and therefore the sale of
control does not affect their rights in any way. However, during the change of control, the other
shareholders are protected by a fiduciary duty and a duty of care that obligates the seller to
guarantee that the new controlling party will not damage the company. See, e.g., CLARK, supra
note 22, at 479.
Similarly, the sale of voting rights in a one-time private transaction does not create a problem of coerced choice. Indeed, the seller will guarantee that the consideration she receives is
sufficient to compensate for the possible dilution of her proportionate rights to the company's
capital; however, the sale of voting rights creates a danger that the rights of other shareholders
will be diluted without compensation. Therefore, in the sale of voting rights, as in the sale of a
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A third characteristic of the strategic vote is the opposing voter's
lack of real alternative. In a coercive vote, if the majority of the voters consent to an offer, the opposing voters will almost certainly be
worse off for having opposed. Therefore, cases such as the "exit consent" offer, where it is clear that the individual cannot oppose the decision without risking damage if the decision is accepted, should be
viewed as coercive.
After identifying situations where a potential for coercive strategic voting exists, my proposed solution concerning a majority vote
binding on the entire voter group should be applied. Nevertheless, we
clearly cannot identify in advance the entire spectrum of cases where
coercive voting may possibly occur. Therefore, the concrete application of the rule that prohibits coercive voting should be assigned to
the courts on a case-by-case basis.
C.

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS PROBLEM

The proposed solution is appropriate for cases where voters have
identical interests and differ only regarding the preferable alternative
for achieving those interests. For example, if the shareholders of a
target company have a common interest-increasing share value-but
differ on the question of whether or not they will benefit from a proposed reorganization, the proposed solution will allow us to ascertain
the group preference. The majority opinion will be the best measure
because majority choice is the most efficient alternative.
On the other hand, the proposed solution will not be appropriate
in cases where the parties have conflicting interests and differ not only
regarding their judgment about the preferred alternative but also regarding the desired result. For example, the decision to add an elevator in a condominium has a different effect on the tenants of ground
floor apartments than on the tenants of the penthouse. Their decisions will not only express the difference in judgment as to the desirability of an elevator but also the inherent conflict of interests as to the
cost of the elevator and its utility to the apartment owners. Such conflicts of interest also exist between securities holders. When such a
conflict of interest exists between voters, the majority's opinion is not
necessarily the most efficient choice for the group.
controlling block of shares, the seller should be bound by a fiduciary duty and a duty of care. See
Brady v. Bean, 221 Ill. App. 279 (1921) (voiding the vote buying as against public policy rather
than as a breach of fiduciary duties).
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The conflict of interests problem is typically found in voting situations where an individual voter belongs to two groups and the decision
being considered will result in the transfer of property from one group
to the other. Take, for example, a shareholder who also holds bonds
in the same company and takes part in a vote to decide whether to
extend the maturity date of the bond issue. It is clear that the loss she
will incur as a bondholder will be regained as profit-according to her
proportionate holdings of each security-in her capacity as a
shareholder.134
In principle, there are three possible solutions to a conflict of interests problem. First, do nothing and let the market solve the problem.135 Second, apply the fairness test. 136 Third, prohibit voting in a
conflict of interests situation.137 As the study of these solutions is beyond the scope of this Article, I will assume that parties in a conflict of
interests are prohibited from voting.

D. A

BINDING VOTE AND INFRINGEMENT ON PROPERTY RIGHTS

Before concluding, I will address the obvious criticism against a
voting system in which the majority's decision binds the entire group.
Critics will no doubt argue that such a system infringes on the property rights of securities holders and that ownership of a security grants
its holder a property right in rem, which prevents the group from forcing him to alter the nature of his ownership. They will point to the
example of a tender offer to bondholders, which if approved by a majority vote will bind all bondholders and require them to tender their
bonds. In such a scenario the dissenting minority, they argue, is
134. See Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1953). In yet another
example an individual attempting a takeover who already owns shares in the company requests
to vote in the shareholders' vote on whether to approve the takeover. Once again, any loss she
may sustain as a shareholder in the target company will be made up for by her profit as a shareholder in the predator company. See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 1760. For a recent case illustrating the complexity of the conflict of interests problem, see Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del.
1996).
135. The market may solve the problem through contractual relations that prohibit voting in
conflict of interests situations, or by a pricing mechanism that takes into consideration the risk
involved with parties voting in conflicts of interest situations. This solution assumes an extremely efficient market.
136. See CLARK, supra note 22, at 166.
137. This solution, known as the "majority of the minority," does not rely on efficient markets. Moreover, it will eliminate the need to pass under judicial review every decision made by
voters in conflict of interests cases. By doing so, however, we greatly increase the minority's
power and, consequently, the risks of a holdout.
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wrongfully "dispossessed" of their property by the majority's
decision. 138
The argument of infringement on property rights fails to take into
account that securities holders' rights are, from the outset, defined in a
manner that subordinates them to future changes. In my view, the
securities holder is afforded a liability-rule-type of legal protection visa-vis the other members of the group.139 Such a liability rule does not
grant the securities holder power to stymie changes in the security
single-handedly, but simply guarantees that the securities holder will
be compensated in the amount determined by the majority when such
changes are made. 140 The subjective valuation of the group (formed
by the majority) serves as the objective value for the opposing minority. This type of liability rule is the general protection governing the
internal relationship of securities holders in corporate law. The proposed binding vote is thus consistent with the liability-rule-type protection as long as the majority required is comparable to the majority
currently required to approve a given decision. To stress this point, I
will examine a number of possible voting situations and contrast my
solution with others currently available.
1.

Tender Offer to Shareholders

The apparent damage that will be caused by a majority vote obligating the entire group to tender their shares in a tender offer can be
compared to a merger in which the majority decision obligates all
shareholders to offer their shares. With respect to the outcome, there
is no difference between the two situations. The central element that
differentiates between them is procedure. Management's consent is a
prerequisite in the merger scenario, whereas in the tender offer it is
not even required. Mergers, however, sometimes require
138. This appears to be the argument that prevented those who adopted Professor
Bebchuk's solution to the problem of distorted choice, including Professor Bebchuk himself,
from proposing such a rule. See Bebchuk, supra note 16; Coffee & Klein, supra note 14. Professor Bebchuk's solution is, for all practical purposes, a half-binding voting system. Under
Bebchuk's proposal if a majority of voters opposes an offer, the bidder must withdraw his offer,
and the voters are not allowed to accept it However, if the majority supports the offer, this does
not obligate any of the voters to actually accept it In the absence of the other half of the
coercive element, the problem of property rights does not arise {although the free rider problem
remains unsolved).
139. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 20, at 1106-10 {describing legal protection afforded by the liability rule).
140. However, the general protection afforded to the security holder vis-a-vis third parties,
is based on a "property rule." That is, a third party cannot force a transaction to transfer a
security or change its rights without the consent of the security's holder.
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supermajority approval. In legal systems that make such a requirement, my proposal will also require a supermajority decision to bind
the minority and obligate them to tender their shares in a tender offer.
Moreover, in a merger the opposing minority usually has additional
remedies available, such as appraisal. But the rationale behind this
remedy is to prevent the potential dangers of a conflict of interests
with the management who must approve the merger. 141 Therefore,
such a remedy is not needed in the case of tender offers. It can be
further argued that management's consent constitutes an additional
defense, as it is a prerequisite for approving minority coercion by the
majority. The tender offer mechanism, however, is based on the need
to prevail over management, who is often in a conflict of interests position. If we accept this argument, we will be removing the very basis
that makes the tender offer mechanism desirable, regardless of the
proposed system obligating the entire group to tender.
2. Reorganization of Voting Rights
The apparent damage that will be caused by a vote binding the
whole group to convert their stocks from one class to another can be
compared to a vote on an amendment to the company's bylaws.
Rather than converting the class of stock, one could simply initiate an
amendment to the company's bylaws leading to a result parallel to the
conversion that follows reorganization. Here too, with respect to the
"damage" incurred by the minority, the result is no different. Nevertheless, to protect the minority certain legal systems require a
supermajority vote to amend the company's bylaws. In such instances, then, in order to bind the minority to convert their shares, my
proposal would also require a supermajority.
3.

Tender Offer to Bondholders

The apparent damage that may result from requiring bondholders
to tender their bonds in a tender offer can be compared to the possibilities that exist for amending bond indentures in the framework of
bankruptcy proceedings. Various bankruptcy proceedings provide for
a workout to be forced on the entire group by a supermajority vote. 142
141. See, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REv. 429 (1985).
142. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a), (c), (d) (1994) (Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
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In bankruptcy proceedings an additional defense mechanism is available to the opposing minority-the protection of the court. In practical terms, the importance of this defense is limited if we prohibit
voting while in a conflict of interests and all members of the group are
supposed to receive equal consideration.

It is important to emphasize that, given that the majority will itself be bound to the same decision and that they are not found to be in
a conflict of interests, we can assume that the offer is fair. The majority would not support a proposal that infringes on its rights. Were it
not for legal consistency, we would be satisfied with a simple majority,143 coupled with a prohibition against voting by parties who are in a
conflict of interests.
We have seen several examples of corporate law treating the
rights of securities holders as a liability rule. In these instances, we
accept that a majority or supermajority decision has the power to effectuate a change in the rights of a securities holder vis-a-vis his security and that, at best, the law provides a mechanism to guarantee that
the securities holder is not made worse off by such a change. I believe
the same holds true for coercive voting situations. The rights of the
securities holders to the security should be viewed as a liability rule,
and he may therefore be bound to act in accordance with majority
decisions in order to prevent coercive voting.

E.

THE NEED FOR A MANDATORY RULE

As shown above, I believe that my proposed simple majority rule,
if enacted into law, can solve the problem of strategic voting. As with
any rule to be enacted into law, one must ask whether it is desirable
for the rule to be mandatory. If one believes in efficient and perfect
markets able to gather, transfer, process, and price all relevant information promptly and accurately there is no need to mandate the
rule.144 However, if one believes that markets are not perfect, the rule
should be mandatory145 for several reasons: First, the companies
143. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization, 78 VA. L REv. 461, 490 (1992).
144. See, e.g., Frank M. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
L. REv. 1416 (1989}.
145. Such a proposal for regulatory intervention requires us to ask why this rule, if we argue
that it is efficient, has not been adopted by at least some companies? The phenomenon of coerced strategic voting became known to the public only recently. In the past we saw other "surprises," such as extreme leveraging, for which the parties only began to provide solutions after it
became clear that the courts were unwilling to interpret an implied covenant into contracts
COLUM.
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themselves are in a situation of coerced choice; second, to save on
transaction costs; and third, because of the problem of disincentives
for corporate management. I will examine these arguments more
carefully.
1.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Among Corporations

Problems of strategic choice exist also among companies concerning the question of whether to adopt a protective covenant that will
protect securities holders against coerced choice. The company must
bear the cost of adopting such a covenant. These expenses are incurred at a number of different levels: There are direct costs, such as
negotiation, drafting, and attorney fees, etc., and there are also indirect costs. Prohibition of coercive voting will cause a certain rigidity
that could encumber the company's operations and its ability to respond to business developments. 146
A company will only find it worthwhile to bear the costs of adopting a protective covenant if it can thereby cause the market to raise
the price of the securities so as to be compensated for these expenses.
For the market to reflect the value of the protective covenant accurately, it will require information about the covenant and about the
chances of it being repealed in the future. Let us assume a market
where some of the companies have adopted such a protective covenant while others have not. The potential investor who does not make
an effort to collect complete information before investing will assume
there is a certain probability that any given company has adopted the
covenant. As a result, the price of the companies that have not
adopted the protective covenant will rise in the same proportion as
the companies that did adopt it. The companies that bore all the expense of adopting the covenant will not be priced to express this fact
accurately. Instead, their price will reflect the probability that any
given company may have adopted the covenant. Companies will find
that they will be better off not adopting this defense, and they will
enjoy the same increase in share value by taking a free ride on other

prohibiting extreme leverage. See Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of
Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, 34 J. L. & EcoN. 645, 657-658 (1991).
146. For example, the company's inability to force bondholders to consent to reorganization
plans increases the risks of bankruptcy.
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companies that have invested resources in adopting the defense. Because all will want to be free riders, no company will adopt the defense, and a product for which there is demand and from which all the
companies stand to benefit will not be supplied.147
This prisoner's dilemma among companies will cause them to
reach a less than optimal equilibrium,148 and this alone is sufficient to
justify mandatory legislation.149
2.

Transaction Costs

A mandatory rule placing a defense on all securities will decrease
transaction costs in a number of ways.15 First, uniformity leads to
savings in the search for information. If it is clear to all investors that
the rule applies to all securities, they will be aqle to price securities
more accurately. Second, uniformity also creates legal certainty as to
the interpretation of the rule and its applicability and allows for precedents that will guide the entire securities market. Legal certainty is
also an important factor in pricing the security. Third, without a
mandatory rule various factors may affect the quality of the protection
afforded by the rule and result in additional information costs.
Adopting a mandatory rule will decrease these costs.

°

3. Agency Costs

It is a well-established principle of corporate law that the firm's
managers are obliged to promote the interests of its shareholders.
Their personal interests, however, are not always identical with those
of the shareholders, and occasionally they come into conflict. The attempt to solve this conflict of interests results in costs commonly referred to as "agency costs."151 Normally, if a company is to adopt a
147. If companies do reach an agreement and adopt the covenant, it will be worthwhile for
the individual company to repeal the defense. In so doing it will forgo the costs involved in
adopting the defense while, at the sarue time, continuing to enjoy a high valuation based on the
market's asswnption that all companies have adopted the defense. Once again, the result will be
that every company will repeal the defense.
148. Toe phenomenon described is known as the "market for lemons." See George A.
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ.
EcoN. 488 (1970); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum
Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979).
149. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REv.
1549, 1567 n.60 (1989).
150. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1599, 1603 (1989).
151. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 68.
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contractual prohibition on the use of coercive voting systems, a proposal in this regard must be submitted by the company's managers.
From the management's perspective, however, the inability to use coercive voting is a source of risk. For example, they will no longer have
the ability to force shareholders into consenting to a reorganization of
voting rights in order to prevent takeovers, nor will they be able to
force bondholders to agree to a reorganization. Management will
therefore refrain from proposing contractual prohibitions on the use
of coercive voting systems.152 A mandatory rule will decrease agency
costs stemming from such behavior.

VI. CONCLUSION
In spite of its drawbacks, voting has the potential to serve as a
vehicle for expressing group preference. Strategic voting distorts efficient results by forcing shareholders to cast their votes in response to
how they believe others will vote rather than according to their true
preference. In certain situations strategic voting causes desired transactions to be forfeited. In other situations strategic voting is used· to
coerce voters into accepting alternatives they would otherwise have
preferred to turn down. Strategic voting is inherent in the voting system, regardless of the type of group involved or the decision being
made. In order to maximize the voting system's potential as a tool for
expressing "group preference," which is a measure of transaction-efficiency and serves to better the group's position, it is imperative that a
free and unrestricted voting environment be maintained.

My conclusion is twofold: First, I suggest adopting a simple majority rule in all group votes, which will significantly limit the effect of
holdouts; second, I propose to eliminate coerced voting by prohibiting
the individual from acting contrary to the majority decision in cases
where such actions could have an adverse affect on the group. Requiring the entire group to adopt a unified course of action will also
eliminate the free rider problem, the prisoner's dilemma, and the coordination problem.

152. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1253.

